Subtitles listening and translating: Lexixi|PR: yyshere|Subtitles: Walk in the rain|Comments:CharlesS|Comments Translation:Marialu|Comments PR: Mr. Xu|Page：Qing Shan
Amid tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Xi Jinping, head of the Chinese Communist Party, visited Fujian, the nearest mainland province to Taiwan at the end of March, during which he inspected the local Armed Police Force on the 24th, but not the Military garrison.
Some analysts said this move is a hesitant move of the Chinese Communist Party towards Taiwan, but I think it needs to be discussed from three perspectives:
What is the Armed Police?
Why did Xi inspect the Armed Police Force?
Why not the army?
The Chinese Communist Party restructured its Armed Police Force at the end of 2017, putting it under the centralized leadership of the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, and decoupling it from the State Council from 2018. This is a clear move for Xi to strengthen the policy of rule by the police. Mr. Miles Guo (Guo Wengui) also revealed in his live broadcast that the actual control of “guns” and “stability maintenance force” of the Chinese Communist Party lie with the police, not in the army.
Why inspecting the local Armed Police Force? First of all, as has made clear above, the CCP’s Armed Police are “the Party’s military police and supervisors”. There is tension across the Taiwan Strait and the Chinese Communist Party is about to take action against Taiwan, so the military strength and the power of the army generals in the near Taiwan area are bound to increase. However, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have always been most concerned about the stability of their power and have no natural alliance with their subordinates, only the binding of interests. In the situation of global encirclement and suppression of the Communist Party of China, is “Emperor Xi” comfortable with the local army that holds the power? Therefore, the inspection of the Armed Police Force may show Xi’s inner nature of distrust and worry about the power of the army.
Before Xi’s visit to Fujian, the local 73rd Army, which was not inspected, had published a series of articles on “New cadres ride the wind and waves” in the military newspaper of the Communist Party of China, showing the internal adjustment imposed on the army.
Well, is Xi’s failure to inspect the army, as some critics think, a sign of indecision about Taiwan? Or is it really as mild, as Xi said, to “promote integration and development”? I think there is little possibility, and this is just a fake détente. Xi visited Fujian very soon after the two sessions (NPC and CPPCC) of the Chinese Communist Party and tightened up control over the army. Under the circumstances of intensive media in China to call for attack against Taiwan, and the constant pressure of the internal and external conflicts of the Communist Party of China, there is no greater interest to make him give up his evil intention of attacking Taiwan. As to the specific time, place, or whether to start from Fujian, etc., I will not speculate here.