DT挖掘机爆料 P4实验室第3季 (1)

【DT挖掘机团队】

序言

香港女英雄科学家闫丽梦的成功出逃和发声爆料CCP病毒真相犹如石破天惊,中共也因此开始了集中抹黑和信息封锁行径,又再玩他们惯用的那一套伎俩。

基于此,为了让更多的人了解真相,DT挖掘战队紧急行动,在《P4实验室第二季》的基础上,进行了这次挖掘行动,为希望了解真相的人们披露更多的线索,同时,也揭开我们的第三季的序幕。

特别强调的是,本次挖掘的内容全部来自可查询的互联网资源,对于其中可能涉及到个人隐私在此一并致歉,DT没有任何意愿侵害所涉及人员的个人隐私。由于CCP病毒牵扯面之广、影响之深,等于全人类所共同面对的一场大劫难,DT挖掘的真实目的在于揭示这场全世界大瘟疫的产生本源,以期望有关人士和国家齐心协力从根本上铲除邪恶生化武器产生的温床,还人类一个安全、平安的生存环境。

关于闫梦丽的一些资料,在GNEWS上已经有战友的一篇文章《“英雄科学家”闫丽梦被CCP删掉了什么资料》链接地址为:https://gnews.org/zh-hans/259481/进行初步挖掘,在这里不再赘述。

在开始挖掘之前,我们先是做一些基础数据的准备,包括对这篇完整的总结:

挖掘基础数据准备

A 英雄科学家基础资料【摘自上述文章】

B 网络上包括FOX视频节目中出现的英雄科学家的照片

我们在挖掘之前先对这七张照片做初步解读,奠定我们这次挖掘的数据基础。

A 人物特征识别 由于照片1、2、3、4均为正面照片,人物特征十分明显,可以简单的总结为“过肩长发、戴眼镜、露齿微笑、身材匀称”为其主要特征,面部识别度较高的美女。

B 工作相关照片 照片5、6清楚地表明了美女科学家的工作单位和相关同事,其中照片5为其在发表的论文前的照片,胸牌和论文上侧的信息应该能够表明其工作单位,可惜照片太模糊看不清楚。照片6中有一个带眼镜的男人没有遮掉,这个人应该很重要。

C 结婚照照片 这张照片基本表明了美女科学家的家庭关系,包括丈夫家庭和自己的家庭,就是美女科学家嫁给了一个外国人(斯里兰卡人),此君家庭包括父母和一个姐姐(或妹妹)(姐姐为推测)和一个弟弟;美女科学家家庭包括父母和一个弟弟。结婚婚礼地址应为国外某个著名景点,背景中有一个教堂。

那么依据以上两组基础资料我们展开我们的挖掘之旅。

1、美女科学家工作照片挖掘

在上述的基础资料中,实际上提出了以下挖掘目标:

1、美女科学家的工作单位到底是哪里

2、美女科学家的相关论文

3、美女科学家的同事。

我们围绕这三个目标依次展开

在展开解读之前我们先出示一组照片,并做分别的解读,解读完这些照片,以上问题自然明朗。

注意这些照片是在CCP及其领导的香港大学对网络上的美女科学家资料进行全面清理后挖掘出来的,具体怎么挖掘只是一个技术问题,在这里再次声明都是来自公开的网站资料。

照片1 2015年 2015年11月24日 Students and lecturers of the 8th HKU-Pasteur Immunology Course. 在这张照片中,美女科学家眼睛没有看照相机镜头,很容易找到,不过这时头发较短。这个会议名称翻译为“第八届香港大学-巴斯德免疫学课程的学生和讲师”,也就是说美女科学家在这里的职位不是学生就是讲师。为了看的更清楚我们提供一个局部放大版。

在这张照片的解读中我们记住一个关键的名称:8th HKU-Pasteur Immunology Course。

照片2 2017年 在这张照片中美女科学家依旧是招牌微笑动作,也很明显。

局部放大版

照片3 2019年 照片标题Tremendous success for the 10th Immunology Course Anniversary Symposium! 以下出示的是一组照片,照片的总的题目是“第十届免疫学课程年度研讨会取得巨大成功!”在这组照片中,同时出现了一位和美女科学家相关的关键人物。这是第一张照片,参加这次会议的人员合影。美女科学家依旧很明显。

此为局部放大图

下面两张图是在不同角度几乎同一时间拍摄的场景,我们的美女科学家在和另外一个外籍男科学家与一个带眼镜的白头发科学家讨论事情。注意第一张照片三个人位置和角度,可以看出美女科学家和中间这位头发密集的科学家的同事关系。在右侧图中我们标出这三个人讨论问题的位置以及左侧照片拍摄的角度。

注意下组这个照片,上面和美女科学家一起参与讨论的那个长头发年轻外籍科学家和美女科学家在餐桌上坐在一起。右侧的照片为这张餐桌在美女科学家这个角度拍照所显示的结果。

我们将左侧的照片局部放大

右侧为同一餐桌敬酒干杯时的照片,美女科学家腾出位置给一位带眼镜的男士敬酒而站在另一侧。

上图中与美女科学家一起讨论的两个人我们在第一张的合影中一起标出。

这组照片不仅证明了我们的美女科学家参与了2019年的这次研讨会,更为重要的是,在会后准备就餐和就餐的过程中,她一直和一个男科学家(斯里兰卡籍)在一起,一起与人交流,相邻就座用餐,那么他们之间是仅仅的同事关系吗?这是这一组照片揭示的挖掘线索。

2 挖挖美女科学家的结婚照

在开始挖掘第二张结婚照照片之前DT还是想说说DT如何进行挖掘的事情。

已经有伪类开始叫板和抹黑我们的英雄美女科学家,他们所谓的论点只能说明他们的愚昧无知。

首先DT挖掘机多次声明全部的挖掘调查资料均来自互联网上可查询的公开资料,不可能去使用暗网或者花钱去购买所谓的情报资料,当然使用一些信息查询网站如果需要会员付费DT也会掏钱的(比如天眼查和国外的金融资料查询网站和一些论文 查询网站)。上面的照片均来自网络,下面出具的照片也来自网络查询。为了给伪类们普及一下DT的挖掘手段,特在这里花费一段文字给他们科普一下,以免他们又弱智地认为这是DT的阴谋论或者说是从七哥手中拿到的内部资料了。

在互联网上搜寻到这些资料路径很简单,就是要从根本上明白CCP删除信息的逻辑和方法。英雄科学家出逃美国是几个月前的事情,为了应对这件事,CCP必须在互联网上删除相关的信息进行掩盖,换句话说,如果CCP在网络上删除了相关的信息,只能证明两件事:A 这个英雄科学家的出逃这件事是真的;B 这位科学家对于他们十分重要。好了,我们这次查询是在英雄科学家的露脸之后,也就是说网络上的相关信息CCP已经进行了大量的清除。这就产生第二个问题:是否还存在没有被清除的信息和资料。换句话说,首先明确CCP能够在互联网上删除哪些信息?明白了这一点就会知道CCP不会有能力删除所有的相关信息。

简单地总结一下:CCP能够屏蔽并清除的信息方法包括:1、拥有管理权限的信息 2、 通过搜索引擎屏蔽信息搜索。3、黑客信息发布的网站。(这一点很少用)

其中1就包括直接命令香港大学、英雄科学家经历过的学校等有关单位删除相关信息,包括命令所掌控的论文发表单位或者平台删除或者修改论文作者顺序和名称等。2 国内所有的搜索引擎已经屏蔽包括英雄科学家姓名在内的一些关键词。 明白了这一点就知道CCP不能删除的信息在哪,一定还会有也就是中共不能删除信息,第一类是个人的社交账号中的信息,比如FACEBOOK、TWITTER这样的社交平台,因为这些账户的管理权限一般不在中共手中。美女科学家位于香港大学,从事科研工作,香港科学家的社交平台习惯使用的一般就是FACEBOOK,和国内的联系应该是微信。所以找到美女科学家的FACEBOOK账号十分关键,因为这个账号控制在美女科学家手中,CCP不可能短时间内删除,并且这个账号一定是和工作无关的,删除的价值不大,但是以中共对FACEBOOK的控制手段一般会在搜索中刻意屏蔽,很难找。第二类是单位已经刊发到网络上新闻报道,这个涉及转载,发布平台等诸多问题是很难删除的,但是中共屏蔽了搜索引擎的搜索仅仅找起来麻烦而已。第三类是国外平台发布的论文等内容,这个涉及到管理权限的问题CCP很难删除的。所以明白了中共不能删除的信息资料包括哪些,就有可能找到这些有价值的信息了。

本文出示的一些资料DT挖掘战队已经在《P4实验室第二季》的挖掘资料准备中进行过一次挖掘,很多资料已经具备,只不过在第二季中没有注意到美女科学家,而是把重点放在另外一些关键的人物上,而这些人物则和美女科学家的爆料是那么的吻合(参见第二季终结篇)。而在第二季完成之后,我们才通过路德节目得知香港美女科学家的出逃,一切又是那么的巧合。

好了,给伪类进行挖掘科普的时间足够了,那么这张抹去了关键人物特征的照片的挖掘重点就在于找到美女科学家的FACEBOOK或者TWITTER的社交网络账号,当然一定很难找。但是,DT挖掘机是有办法找到的。为了尊重美女科学家,我们在没有征得她同意前先不曝光关键的几张照片,至于判断的过程也不再出示,因为种种证据都已经证明了那个企图杀害自己妻子的斯里兰卡科学家到底是谁,他是不是上面那个科学家?大家自己判断吧。关于上面的那个科学家在学术上的挖掘我们会在后面进行的,因为他很重要!

在这里,DT虽然不想继续八卦,但是还是要出示一些照片,当看到这些照片时,估计美女科学家会热泪盈眶,我们在挖掘到这些照片时也是热泪盈眶,心潮澎湃,从内心的感动,感激香港,感激上天给我们送来一个拯救世界的女神,一个对付潘多拉盒子的女神雅典娜,而她是一个美丽、善良、真正、勇敢的中国女人,一个青岛女孩,用言语已经无法表达我们的敬意和感激之情了!上图吧。

这是这位女神在2018年9月在加拿大举办婚礼上的部分照片,一切都是那么美好,她拥有美丽和浪漫的生活,为了揭露CCP病毒的真相,她毅然决然地舍弃了… …。

3 挖挖美女科学家的论文

关于学术论文的挖掘在战友发表在GNEWS上的文章中已经做过,这里之所以再做一次挖掘是因为我们和战友的挖掘角度不同,不是证实其真实性和女科学家的重要性(这是不需要证明的),关于这两篇关键性论文和其他论文的学术解读我们在随后的挖掘调查文章里会有正义科学家进行解读,这不是本文的重点,我们还是先看看这两篇论文:

我先看这一篇论文:

注意带*号的通讯作者。关于论文作者的排序解读请参考“冠军的亲爹“的推文,在这里不再赘述。我们依据这篇论文的内容列出全部作者名单,按照论文中的顺序:

Yang Liu, Li-Meng Yan, Lagen Wan,Tian-Xin Xiang, Aiping Le,Jia-Ming Liu, Malik Peiris,*Leo L M Poon, *Wei Zhang。

再看一篇论文:

同样列出作者名称,姓名后的数字为每个人在这篇论文中的排名,1 为第一作者,1.3为并列第一作者,2为第二作者,✉为通讯作者。

Sin Fun Sia1,3, Li-Meng Yan1,3, Alex W. H. Chin1,3, Kevin Fung2, Ka-Tim Choy1, Alvina Y. L. Wong1, Prathanporn Kaewpreedee1, Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera1, Leo L. M. Poon1, John M. Nicholls2, Malik Peiris1 & Hui-Ling Yen1 ✉。

去掉一些信息进行简化:Sin Fun Sia, Li-Meng Yan, Alex W. H. Chin, Kevin Fung, Ka-Tim Choy, Alvina Y. L. Wong,Prathanporn Kaewpreedee, Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera, Leo L. M. Poon, John M. Nicholls,Malik Peiris , Hui-Ling Yen

第三篇论文:

作者列出如下:

Thomas H. C. Sit1, Christopher J. Brackman1, Sin Ming Ip1, Karina W. S. Tam1, Pierra Y. T. Law1, Esther M. W. To1, Veronica Y. T. Yu1, Leslie D. Sims2, Dominic N. C. Tsang3, Daniel K. W. Chu4, Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera4, Leo L. M. Poon4 & Malik Peiris4,5 ✉

第四篇论文:

作者列出如下:

Sophie A. Valkenburg1,2*, Nancy H. L. Leung2, Maireid B. Bull1,2, Li-meng Yan2, Athena P. Y. Li1,2, Leo L. M. Poon2 and Benjamin J. Cowling2

同时注意这句话:出现了几个关于作者来源机构的描述。

  1. HKU Pasteur Research Pole, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong,
  2. WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong

依据上述材料,我们制作出下列简单统计表格:在表格中去掉非港大的作者。

以上列出的四篇论文中,其中三篇和CCP病毒相关,三篇作者中包括英雄科学家,经过筛选,列出的作者全部来自以下这两个通信地址机构1 HKU Pasteur Research Pole, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, 2 WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong。在解读这两个通讯地址之前我们先依据以前的挖掘资料完善上面的表格,就是尽可能地列出作者的中文译名和在HKU MED/HKU PRP两个机构的任职,列出姓名在论文中出现的次数:我们重点考察论文次数为2次以上的作者以及通讯作者。

这张精简的表格说明了什么:

1、在没有正义科学家解读情况下说明了英雄美女科学家在相关病毒研究中的重要性。其中关键的一个传播模型的研究论文中就有她的名字。并且在研究者中同时拥有MD, PhD并不多见。在巴斯德的职员表中大多拥有PhD。而在香港大学公共卫生学院的职员中,只有Fukuda, Keiji(学院院长)这样身份的人才同时拥有MD, MPH这样身份,其中一个著名的研究者管轶就是同时拥有MD, PhD身份。而Leo L. M. Poon的学术身份则是这些BSc(HKBU), MPhil(CUHK), DPhil(Oxon), FFPH (UK)。

2、根据美女科学家和路德节目以及文贵视频直播爆料去从架构上验证这种逻辑关系是十分精准的,其中英雄科学家和路德爆料中的Malik就是裴伟士,也就是DT在第二季中爆出的那个斯里兰卡人。此人已在女英雄科学家成功出逃后于七月初离职并返回斯里兰卡。在这里DT释放一些这个裴伟士离职告别晚宴的照片,并希望他不被CCP灭口,在第三季中,关于此人的挖掘爆料还有很多资料。Leo L. M. Poon就是潘烈文。Hui-Ling Yen中文名称为叶慧玲,Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera这个人已经从巴斯德的雇员名单上消失,当然这奇怪的斯里兰卡人也没有出现在裴伟士的告别晚宴上。

3、注意这几个人职务表述

  • Li-Meng Yan:Division of Public Health Laboratory Sciences;
  • Leo L. M. Poon:Professor and Division Head Public Health Laboratory Sciences;
  • Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera:Division of Public Health Laboratory Sciences;
  • Malik Peiris: Chair of Virology Public Health Laboratory Sciences

这些表述表明了这几个人在实验室工作中的领导关系,如果Li-Meng Yan在Leo L. M. Poon领导的实验室中的话,Leo L. M. Poon则是Li-Meng Yan的领导,论文中的关系和排名位置也证明了这一点。Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera应该在Malik Peiris的实验室,也就是说Malik Peiris是这个实验室的领导,而Malik Peiri还是巴斯德的真正的大领导,在第二季爆料中已经爆出他就是CCP病毒研制最重要的一个人物之一,也是病毒生化武器国际纵队的研制核心人物。换句话说,英雄科学家的爆料绝对不是危言耸听,而是血淋淋的事实真相!

4、这张表格几乎把我们第三季挖掘中关键的几个人物和几个重要的机构都暴露出来,或者说是我们进行第三季挖掘的真正的入口,就和第二季挖掘中的选择郭德银作为切入点一样。不同的是,英雄科学家的这场揭幕之战将会揭开P4实验室所隐含的真正秘密。一切又是那么神奇。

我们在解构这几个机构的关系之前先来看看这个著名的斯里兰卡人Malik(裴伟士)在离开香港巴斯德时的画面,这个他服务了十四年的神秘的香港巴斯德研究所或许会因为他的离开揭开面纱了!

奇怪的是,在裴伟士告别晚宴上有三个关键的人物没有出现,其中一个就是他的同胞Ranawaka A. P. M. Perera,还有一个就是我们的美女科学家,当然她不可能出现在这里。最重要的一个人物,也就是香港巴斯德的大领导孔祥勉的儿子孔令成(香港海洋公园董事会主席)也没有来参加送别晚宴,这究竟意味着什么?或许他们专门准备了一场特殊的告别晚宴吧。

(以下为孔令成参加巴斯德集体活动照片)

4 几个机构的关系和几个关键的人物

下面我们根据这段表述来挖掘上面表格中出现的两个机构的名称“HKU MED”“HKU PRP”的具体含义和相关关联。

  1. HKU Pasteur Research Pole, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong,
  2. WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong。

这两个就是两个单位的通讯地址,其中Pokfulam就是指香港的一个区,薄扶林,也就是香港大学的所在地。查询的维基百科资料如下:

薄扶林(英文:Pok Fu Lam或Pokfulam,粤拼︰bok6*3 fu4*6 lam4[注 1])位于香港岛南区,是香港岛的市郊部分之一,通常指北至南区的沙湾、摩天岭以南、南至瀑布湾的南区区域,其中薄扶林近南区部分的大部分私人屋苑(如置富花园)及别墅为香港中产阶级至上层阶级人士的集中地。

1860年左右,薄扶林是英国商人的夏季避暑区,山腰、山顶别墅林立,山顶有守望者房屋数间,户外有旗杆,凡有轮船到港,守望者升旗为号。薄扶林附近有跑马场(现址薄扶林骑径学校),每逢孟春赛马,仕女如云。港督还创建一所占地百顷的公园。而当时旧香港八景的“扶林曲径”,便是指薄扶林道一带的景色。

1883年,香港第一个水塘——薄扶林水塘落成,为香港提供自来水,泉水来自太平山,由管道引至水塘。1885年,香港牛奶公司于薄扶林村附近,即今置富花园现址,兴建牧场,称为薄扶林牧场,是香港的第一个牧场。

1911年,香港大学在薄扶林北面成立[4],并在邻近山麓兴建行政大楼、教学大楼和大学宿舍,因而有不少大学职员和学生居住于薄扶林区。

1970年代,香港政府颁布一项名为“薄扶林延期履行权”的行政措施,以区内交通基建设施未完善为理由,限制区内的发展,使薄扶林中低密度发展的格局维持至今。

A HKU Pasteur Research Pole,简称HKU PRP,中文名称:香港大学巴斯德研究中心。

在下面这篇回忆香港大学巴斯德研究中心的合作创建者之一孔祥勉的文章中记述了一些历史:

In Memorian: Dr James Ziang Mien Kung

It is with great sadness that we announce that Dr James Ziang Mien Kung, our Chairman, passed away peacefully on Sunday, May 9th, 2010 at the age of 82.

We are particularly indebted to Dr Kung for the pivotal role he played in securing a collaborative agreement in 1999 between the Institut Pasteur and the then Faculty of Medicine of the University of Hong Kong (HKU). As a result of his tireless efforts, an agreement to establish the HKU-Pasteur Research Centre (HKU-PRP) was signed that year and the Centre was inaugurated in the year 2000. Dr Kung served as convenor of the HKU-Pasteur Foundation Preparatory Committee and was Chairman of the HKU-PRP. His contribution to our Centre, the Institut Pasteur International Network and our partnership with HKU cannot be fully expressed in words.

Dr Kung was a philanthropist who supported education and the pursuit of knowledge to benefit mankind. For his active role in promoting these values in the community, he received several awards, including an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1990, an honorary Doctor of Business Administration degree in 1991 from the then Hong Kong Polytechnic, an OBE in 1994, and an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Hong Kong in 2000. He was also Honorary Patron of the HKU Foundation. He was made Grand Officer of the Order of Merit of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in 1994, and Commander in the Order of Leopold in 1997. In 2003, Dr Kung was awarded a Gold Bauhinia Star for his distinguished services to the Hong Kong community. He had strong ties with the French community in Hong Kong for many years. He was honoured in 2007 as Grand Officer dans L’Ordre National de la Légion d’Honneur. Dr James Kung will be sorely missed and warmly remembered by all those who knew him.

B WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control,简称WHO CCIDEC中文名称为:世界传染病流行病学及控制合作中心。

以下为其简介:

Introduction

The School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine of The University of Hong Kong has been designated as a WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control since 10 December 2014. The Centre is headed by Professor Benjamin John Cowling and Dr Seto Wing-hong of the School. The designation of HKU School of Public Health as a WHO CC is the first of such kind at the University.

The HKU School of Public Health has a long and distinguished history in high impact research and public health education. With a view to protecting the public’s health in Hong Kong and across our region, the WHO CC looks forward to coordinating research on the control and prevention of infectious diseases and providing local and regional education and training in infectious disease epidemiology and control.

Terms of Reference

(1) In collaboration with WHO, further the work of Infection Prevention and Control

(2) Strengthen capacity for surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR)

(3) Emergency Response to Outbreaks of Novel Pathogens

Membership

The Centre is governed by a Steering Committee which shall direct the activity of the Centre, monitor progress on projects and deliverables in the workplan, and prepare the yearly progress report for submission to the WHO. The Steering Committee is chaired by the Centre Heads, Professor Benjamin John Cowling and Dr Seto Wing-hong, with members comprising Professor Joseph Sriyal Malik Peiris, Professor Joseph Wu, and any other members as nominated by the Heads.

The general membership of the Centre will comprise faculty members of Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, and by invitation from the Centre Heads.

C HKU SPH School of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong 中文名称香港大学公共卫生学院

History

Public health has a long established tradition at The University of Hong Kong. It was first introduced into the medical curriculum at the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese (the forerunner of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Hong Kong), which was established by Sir Patrick Manson1, Sir James Cantlie and Sir Ho Kai in 1887. In 1891, Sun Yat-sen, one of the first students of the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese, sat the professional examination on public health. In 1950, the Department of Social Medicine was established. In 1970, the name was changed to the Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, and to the Department of Community Medicine in 1974.

In 2004, The University of Hong Kong approved the proposal to establish a School of Public Health2, the Public Health Research Centre was established as one of the five research centres in the Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, and Master of Medical Science (Public Health) was transformed into our own postgraduate degree programme – the Master of Public Health. In 2005, the University Research Committee recognized public health as one of nineteen Strategic Research Themes for the University. In 2009, the inauguration of the School of Public Health was officiated by Professor Chen Zhu, Minister of Health for China.

In 2013, the School of Public Health formally incorporated the Department of Community Medicine and the Behavioural Sciences Unit.

In July 2016, the academic and research arms of the Institute of Human Performance were incorporated into the School of Public Health of Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine.

Heads

  • 1950-1952 TS Sze Chair, Department of Social Medicine
  • 1952-1957 KC Yeo Chair, Department of Social Medicine
  • 1957-1974 PH Teng Chair, Department of Social Medicine (1957-59)
  • Chair, Department of Social and Preventive Medicine (1959-74)
  • 1974-1980 MJ Colbourne Head, Department of Community Medicine
  • 1978-1987 J Anderson Head, Behavioural Sciences Unit
  • 1980-1987 JWL Kleevens Head, Department of Community Medicine
  • 1987-2000 AJ Hedley Head, Department of Community Medicine
  • 1987-2013 R Fielding Head, Behavioural Sciences Unit (Professor Fielding, Richard 莊日昶)
  • 2000-2012 TH Lam Head, Department of Community Medicine,(Lam, Tai Hing,)
  • Director, School of Public Health (2004-2012)
  • 2012-2013 GM Leung Head, Department of Community Medicine, Acting Director, School of Public Health
  • 2013-2017 JSM Peiris Director, School of Public Health
  • 2017- Keiji Fukuda Director, School of Public Health

历届院长列表

D香港大学李嘉诚医学院 HKUMed

以下资料来自维基百科:

香港大学李嘉诚医学院(英语:Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong,亦简称HKUMed),原称香港大学医学院,为一所坐落于香港港岛薄扶林的医学院。其院址离香港大学本部有数公里之远,邻近作为其教学及研究基地的玛丽医院。港大医学院现提供医学、中医学、护理学、药学及生物医学的教育与研究项目。除中医课程采用中英双语教学外,所有课程均以英语作为授课语言。主要的教学医院为位于附近的玛丽医院。

香港大学李嘉诚医学院是香港最早成立的医学院,已有逾百年历史,时至今日香港也仅有两所同时提供医学及药学专业培训的医学院,另一所为1981年成立的香港中文大学医学院。

学院的前身是创立于1887年的香港华人西医书院,后于1907年更名为香港西医书院,[1] 是远东其中一所历史最悠久的西医教育机构,中华民国国父孙中山曾习医于此,为书院第一届毕业生,并以优异成绩毕业。

1910年香港大学成立,原香港西医书院并入香港大学成为港大本部辖下的医学院,成为香港大学创校时成立的三大学院之一。1912年,香港大学本部大楼落成启用,成为医学院主要的教学和办公场地,医学院当时使用西区国家医院作为教学医院。玛丽医院于1937年启用后,成为医学院新的教学医院。香港日占时期,香港大学医学院曾内迁至中国四川成都办学。

1964年,位于玛丽医院附近的医学院大楼落成,并以养和医院创办人李树芬命名。

1996年,由于原有医学院大楼(李树芬楼,现赛马会跨学科大楼)日渐破旧,加上附近的香港教育学院罗富国分校即将迁入新界大埔,在罗富国教育学院原址建造新医学院综合大楼的计划正式立项,并于1997年11月罗师大楼腾空后正式动工。

2002年,医学院新综合大楼舍落成,由英国唐谋士建筑师事务所设计,并由香港宝嘉建筑承建[2]。同年,李树芬楼拆卸,其后丢空至2009年后改建为赛马会跨学科大楼,专供一些与医学院有合作的港大部门使用。

2006年1月1日,医学院正式命名为“香港大学李嘉诚医学院”。

2005年5月7日,香港大学宣布获香港首富李嘉诚及李嘉诚基金会承诺十亿港元捐款,5月18日港大建议将医学院命名为李嘉诚医学院以表彰李嘉诚及其基金会的慷慨捐赠,并获港大校务委员会一致通过。此决定曾引起医学院旧生的关注及反对,但经咨询后校方表示将维持原来决定,而李嘉诚亦发公开信表示“没有改变自己的看法”。香港大学医学院于2006年1月1日正式命名为“香港大学李嘉诚医学院”。

反对把医学院命名人士有香港立法会医学界议员郭家麒,他声言发起全球港大医学院校友筹款,以赎回医学院原名[3]。另一港大医学院校友谢鸿兴亦反对命名,命名当日亦会发起抗议活动。

在李嘉诚医学院的网站上,学院的院系设置共有如下18个院系,其中School of Public Health也就是公共卫生学院就是香港大学医学院的一个院系。

  1. Department of Anaesthesiology
  2. School of Biomedical Sciences
  3. School of Chinese Medicine
  4. Department of Clinical Oncology
  5. Department of Diagnostic Radiology
  6. Department of Family Medicine and Primary Care
  7. Department of Medicine
  8. Department of Microbiology
  9. School of Nursing
  10. Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology
  11. Department of Ophthalmology
  12. Department of Orthopaedics and Traumatology
  13. Department of Paediatrics and Adolescent Medicine
  14. Department of Pathology
  15. Department of Pharmacology and Pharmacy
  16. Department of Psychiatry
  17. School of Public Health
  18. Department of Surgery

我们来简单地梳理一下ABCD这四者之间的关系:香港大学李嘉诚医学院 HKUMed 隶属于香港大学,是香港大学的医学学院,而香港大学公共卫生学院则是李嘉诚医学院下属的一个院系,所以这个院系的学生习惯性称自己为HKU Med,而其真正的名字应该为 HKU Med SPH。

而香港大学巴斯德研究中心HKUPRP和WHO CCIDEC中文名称为:世界传染病流行病学及控制合作中心则是香港大学和不同机构合作在香港大学李嘉诚医学院下属公共卫生学院设置的两个研究中心。

事情真的这么简单吗?在展开解读之前我们先把上面的资料汇总成一个简单的表格,这个表格主要表述上述四个机构设立的时间。

在解读上面的表格内容代表什么之前我们先看看香港大学的一个重要的P3实验室的挖掘。

这就是“H5参考实验室”。

我们先来看看一些相关资料:

为了进一步说明问题,我们将报道的全文摘录如下:

香港大学李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院世卫「传染病流行病学及控制」合作中心及世卫H5参考实验室之揭幕仪式

星期日, 16 8月 2015

香港大学(港大)李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院于上星期四(8月13日)举行世卫「传染病流行病学及控制」合作中心及世卫H5参考实验室的揭幕仪式。是次承蒙世界卫生组织总干事陈冯富珍医生担任主礼嘉宾并主持揭幕仪式;出席嘉宾包括卫生署署长陈汉仪医生、渔农自然护理署署长梁肇辉博士、港大李嘉诚医学院院长梁卓伟教授及港大李嘉诚医学院副院长(研究)梁雪儿教授等。

自2014年12月10日起,港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院获世卫委任为「传染病流行病学及控制」合作中心,为期四年。合作中心由港大李嘉诚医学院院长及公共卫生医学讲座教授梁卓伟教授,和港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院名誉临床教授司徒永康教授领导。世卫合作中心由世卫总干事所委任,为世卫合作网络一重要骨干,以支持世卫在国与国之间、不同区域乃至全球的医疗卫生规划,中国和香港则分别有59个及6个世卫合作中心。

港大公共卫生学院是香港大学第一所获世卫委任为合作中心的学术部门。梁卓伟教授衷心感谢世卫总干事陈冯富珍医生莅临港大和主礼揭幕仪式:「港大公共卫生学院一直走在研究新发传染病的最前端,我们期待与世卫通力合作,致力提高全球公众健康以及控制和预防传染病的工作。」同时,梁院长感谢卫生署署长陈汉仪医生及渔农自然护理署署长梁肇辉博士出席揭幕典礼时道:「自二零零三年非典肺炎疫情后,港府已加强对传染病流行病学及传染病控制之研究及培训;今次港大公共卫生学院获委任成为世卫合作中心,是对港大和食物及卫生局长期合作共同守护香港以至周边地区公共健康的嘉冕和肯定。」

另外,港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院的流感研究中心为世卫于全球共13所H5参考实验室之一。其宗旨主要是为促进对H5及动物传染病之相关流感病毒之科学研究及培训,提供国际性科研参考实验室服务,从而向世卫提供有关动物传染病对公共卫生威胁之风险评估,以及对有关病毒的疫苗开发之相关建议。为履行相关职责,香港大学H5 参考实验室每年均会参予两次世卫组织流感疫苗的筛选会议,以检讨及拟订有关处理动物传染病的公共卫生策略。港大公共卫生学院院长裴伟士教授及港大H5 参考实验室联席总监道:「凭借港大公共卫生学院多年来在动物传染病及相关病毒而引起人类感染的研究成果,我们将继续协助世卫,共同应对由禽流感对公共健康所带来的威胁,并致力推动框架。」

关于世卫合作中心

世卫合作中心由世卫总干事委任,于各大学学系、研究中心或政府部门,实行及支持有关医疗卫生的相关规划。目前,80个会员国当中有700多所世卫合作中心,与世卫共同致力于护理、职业健康、传染病、营养、精神健康、慢性疾病和医疗技术等领域的工作。

关于世卫H5参考实验室

世卫于2004年成立H5参考实验室网络,为世卫对全球流感监测和应对系统之一个重要特定组织,以便协助世卫应对由禽流感(H5N1)所带来的国际公共卫生的挑战及医疗负担。目前,全球共有13所实验室被指定为世卫H5参考实验室,而港大H5 参考实验室为其始创成员之一。

关于港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院

港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院在公共卫生教育及科研方面成就卓越,历史悠久,并致力于改善人类健康。通过结合流行病学及大规模的研究室实验,以及对非传染病的疾病控制,学院对提升本地乃至国际的公共卫生及医疗研究发展作出重大贡献。港大公共卫生学院为顶尖科研中心,其研究范畴包括流行性感冒、传染病及非传染性之慢性疾病控制、控烟、改善空气质素、心理肿瘤学、健康服务研究、行为科学、生命历程流行病学、医疗经济效益、医疗服务规划及管理等,当中不少研究更获本地、国内以至国际组织,如世界卫生组织认同,纳入其公共卫生政策当中。

(左起)港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院教授及流行病和生物统计学分部主任高本恩教授、卫生署署长陈汉仪医生、港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院院长兼病毒学讲座教授、谭华正基金教授(医疗科学)裴伟士教授、世界卫生组织总干事陈冯富珍医生、渔农自然护理署署长梁肇辉博士、港大李嘉诚医学院院长兼公共卫生学院世卫「传染病流行病学及控制」合作中心联席总监梁卓伟教授及港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院名誉临床教授兼公共卫生学院世卫「传染病流行病学及控制」合作中心联席总监司徒永康教授。

(左起)港大李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院院长兼病毒学讲座教授、谭华正基金教授(医疗科学)裴伟士教授、渔农自然护理署署长梁肇辉博士、世界卫生组织总干事陈冯富珍医生、卫生署署长陈汉仪医生、港大李嘉诚医学院流感研究中心总监及公共卫生学院于崇光基金教授(病毒学)管轶教授及港大李嘉诚医学院院长兼公共卫生学院世卫「传染病流行病学及控制」合作中心联席总监梁卓伟教授。

香港大学校长马斐森教授于为陈冯富珍医生举办的午宴上颁赠纪念品。

在GNEWS上有一篇爆料文章《斯里兰卡的裴伟士和他的同事潘烈文》链接地址:https://gnews.org/zh-hans/194829/对这实验室和裴伟士的资料做了一些揭示。

世卫H5参考实验室是在2003年SARS之后的2004年由WHO组织和成立。为世卫对全球流感监测和应对系统之一个重要特定组织,以便协助世卫应对由禽流感(H5N1)所带来的国际公共卫生的挑战及医疗负担。目前,全球共有13所实验室被指定为世卫H5参考实验室,而港大H5 参考实验室为其始创成员之一。注意这个参考实验室不仅仅应对H5N1禽流感,而是拓展到所有的传染病和流行病毒也就是后来推出的世卫「传染病流行病学及控制」合作中心的核心实验室。

换句话说“世卫H5参考实验室”不仅仅是一块牌子,更是世卫组织应对全球流感等传染病进行监测和发布全球措施的一个重要特定组织,所谓参考就是因为世界卫生组织只是一个发布示警和协调行动的机构,而是否发布全球的流行病毒和传染病的警报和级别需要参考这些实验室的监测、测试和预测的实验结果。因为世卫组织没有研究能力,这个过程已经在这次CCP病毒的全球扩散的过程中显露无疑了。

好了,让我们在上面这些资料的基础上分析上面这张简单的表格的背后的诡异之处,我们先简单地按照时间线进行梳理,当然这里面会有很多《P4实验室第二季中的资料和内容》:

2000年,孔祥勉作为重要推动者促成法国巴斯德研究所与香港大学共建香港大学巴斯德研究中心;注意香港大学巴斯德研究中心的资金来源主要是孔祥勉执掌的巴斯德亚洲基金会。现任主席为孔祥勉的儿子孔令成。

2003年,北京爆发SARS,广东、香港亦有感染。而在SARS研究中做出重要贡献的袁国勇、管轶则在香港大学公共卫生学院,袁国勇不仅是香港巴斯德的负责人而且是生物系的主任,相关的挖掘可以参考第二季。

2003年,陈竺主持启动P4实验室建设项目。

2004年WHO创立 “世卫H5参考实验室”正是基于中国政府和香港在抗击SARS和香港对SARS冠状病毒的辉煌战果的基础上,使得香港大学袁国勇掌控的(巴斯德也在使用)P3实验室(流感研究中心)成为H5参考实验室的创立者之一,同时也奠定了香港大学公共卫生学院在WHO流行病及病毒防控和研究上的话语权。

而2004年,在上海,上海巴斯德研究所由巴斯德研究所、中国科学院与上海市政府成立,主要针对中国公众健康的问题,集中研究传染病,特别是病毒。上海巴斯德研究所秉承了全球巴斯德研究所的三大宗旨,包括优质研究、积极关注公众健康和致力推动教育与培训。

2005年,2月25日,李嘉诚基金会宣布捐款三百万欧元(逾港币三千万元),资助全球顶尖研究机构法国巴斯德研究所(Institut Pasteur),与近年在禽流感及新发传染病研究接连创出佳绩的汕头大学医学院香港大学医学院联合流感研究中心的合作,为全球对抗禽流感工作的国际力量增添一股新动力。一个由巴斯德研究所、上海巴斯德研究所、联合流感研究中心和李嘉诚基金会代表所组成的管理委员会将会成立,负责督导合作计划和各项工作的推展,并监督各项工作的进展与成效。注意这种表述的管理委员会的成员,巴斯德研究所、上海巴斯德研究所、联合流感研究中心和李嘉诚基金会,在第二季的挖掘中我们曾经揭示过,这个联合流感研究中心管理者主要人员就是管轶或者说香港大学医学院的团队(也就是香港巴斯德)。

2006年李嘉诚斥资10亿港币将香港大学医学相关机构整合成香港大学李嘉诚医学院,同时公共卫生学院并入其中成为五大研究中心之一。

2006年,还有一个重要的人物出现在香港的巴斯德,这就是裴伟士。而这个裴伟士在世卫于2004年成立H5参考实验室网络以应对H5N1带来的挑战,港大H5参考实验室是其创始成员之一,时任WHO总干事陈冯富珍以及Malik(裴伟士)参加了揭幕仪式。

Malik之前也曾是WHO的免疫专家战略咨询专家组的一员,在WHO多个委员会中服务,并代表WHO调查在中国大陆的H7N9甲型流感和在韩国以及沙特的MERS。

他同时也是美国国立卫生研究院NIAID流感监测与研究中心(CEIRS)计划的研究员,该计划旨在应对流感大流行的威胁。NIAID现在的主管是Fauci博士。

他还是《柳叶刀传染病》的编委。

1981年,他在英国获得D.Phil学位,他的学位论文的一个主要方面就是,抗体可能在促进而不是阻止病毒进入巨噬细胞中发挥了自相矛盾的作用。

1995年,他在香港大学下属的玛丽医院建立了临床和公共卫生病毒学的实验室。

1997年,香港首次爆发人类H5N1禽流感病毒,Peiris教授的实验室研究关注到了“细胞因子风暴”,它被认为是禽流感病毒发病机理的主要机制。

2003年,他的实验室分离出了SARS的病原体,6月份,他的实验室及其合作者已经使用实时PCR来诊断SARS。这个时候裴伟士在香港大学下属的玛丽医院。

也就是在2006年玛丽医院因香港大学李嘉诚医学院的成立并入香港大学李嘉诚医学院后这个裴伟士开始任职香港大学巴斯德研究中心。

这个时间线加上香港大学李嘉诚医学院公共卫生学院院长的任命更加说明一些问题:

  • Lam, Tai Hing 林大慶 2009-2013
  • GM Leung 梁卓伟2012-2013
  • JSM Peiris 裴伟士2013-2017
  • Keiji Fukuda 福田敬二 2017-

在这个院长名单中,有三人包括林大慶、裴伟士、福田敬二具有WHO官员经历和背景,换句话说在WHO中具有相当大的影响力。而梁卓伟、裴伟士则是研究冠状病毒的专家。

这一切难道是巧合吗?

挖掘到这里,我们有充分的理由和逻辑相信,CCP对WHO的掌控布局自从2003年SARS爆发之时就已经开始,这是一个惊天的大布局,其控制的核心就是香港大学的公共卫生学院。而揭开中共展控下WHO的真实面具正是第三季挖掘的一个内容,可以肯定说,WHO是CCP豢养的一条恶犬,在CCP针对美国和全球使用扩散生化病毒武器这场战争中,它成了可耻的帮凶。

在这里,首先提醒一下,不要忘了三个关键人物梁卓伟、裴伟士、福田敬二的美国经历和背景,其中福田敬二还是一个真正的美国人。

5 关键的一张照片:

在本文的最后,我们出示一张和美女英雄科学家相关的一张关键的照片。

2019年1月21日,我们的英雄科学家在其工作单位香港大学公共卫生学院负责接待了一位著名的美国学者专家,并拍摄了这张照片:

照片标题:

2019 1.21. Our MPH students had the privilege to meet Prof Barry Bloom from Harvard in an exclusive sharing session. Prof Barry Bloom has been a pioneer in infectious disease research and vaccine science and was Dean of Harvard School of Public Health from 1999 to 2009. He spent over 35 years as principal investigator researching the immune response to tuberculosis in his Harvard lab and his scientific contributions have made him a trusted adviser in public health policy worldwide. We thank Prof Bloom for his generous sharing with our students.

这位著名的Barry Bloom教授在2020年的3月19日在美国的媒体上发表了一份针对CCP病毒的访谈,全文内容我们摘录如下:

Coronavirus (COVID-19): Press Conference with Barry Bloom, 03/19/20

Transcript

You’re listening to a press conference from the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health featuring Barry Bloom, professor of immunology and infectious diseases and former dean of the school. This call was recorded at 2:30 pm Eastern Time on Thursday, March 19.

BARRY BLOOM : Greetings, everyone. My name is Barry Bloom. I’m a professor and the former dean of the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health. My long-term scientific interest has been global health. My field is immunology of infectious diseases. I’m pleased to be on this call.

Perhaps I have a somewhat unusual perspective, in that I had been invited with a colleague after SARS erupted and China failed to address it adequately. In 2003, was invited by the ministry of health to give advice on what they could have done better. And those lessons have carried through to the present time and seeing the current spread of the new coronavirus around the world and things that every country has to do to be prepared.

So I would look forward to trying to answer your questions. I state in advance there still remains an awful lot uncertain in the scientific world. But I’ll do my very best to be helpful.

OPERATOR : And at this time, are we wanting to open the floor for questions? We’ll take our first question in the queue.

Q: Hi, Barry.Quick question on the statistics out of China this morning where they’re showing no new cases in Wuhan or the surrounding province. Do you have any reason to doubt those numbers? I mean, is the decline we’re seeing in China real? And do you have a sense that sort of gives us hope as to a way forward?

BARRY BLOOM: It’s a very important and very good question. I think many of us weeks ago were very skeptical of numbers coming out of China, not that we knew they weren’t correct. But with the interest in keeping the bad news as minimal as possible, one didn’t know to what extent one could trust the numbers.

We had a symposium at the School of Public Health last, I think, Friday. And had videoed in the dean of the medical school at Hong Kong, a former Takemi Fellow and Harvard School of Public Health graduate, who has been the major advisor, both to the government of Hong Kong and a major advisor to the government of China, and also a member of the commission, the WHO commission in China. And having expressed his earlier skepticism was quite confident the numbers we had been getting as of a week ago for at least several weeks prior to that have been quite accurate and were checked and examined carefully by the WHO independent group. So, I’m inclined to believe that if they say there are no cases over a 24-hour period, they’re probably telling it right.

Q: And what are the implications of that? Is that a model that we here in the US can follow?

BARRY BLOOM: Well, the dramatic effect in China was to allow the epidemic to get ahead of the ability to respond in a public health way, which is the problem that occurs in all epidemics– in most epidemics. And since the epidemic doubles every week, if you start with 100 cases, in seven weeks you have 65,000 cases. That’s hard for people to understand.

But the answer is, here it was clear they knew in late November or early December. But only on the 31st did the world know they had an infectious disease problem. So, I would think from there on they’ve had to introduce very stringent suppression measures of keeping people from leaving their homes and dealing with social interactions.

The point here being, it worked. The numbers, ultimately, came down. People were enormously inconvenienced. An awful lot of people got sick and died. But the numbers have come down.

There are two questions that arise from your question. The one is, will it stay down? And no one knows. And China, I think, has been lifting the ability of people to go to work restraint. And if it is done gradually and slowly, it is, I think, most likely it will be– there will be bursts of outbreaks, but they will be controllable.

Q: Thank you.

OPERATOR : We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Yes, thank you. I have two questions about the fine points of symptoms. And I know these are not easy to tackle. But there’s a lot of concern out there. So we can shed a little bit of light. If a person feels chest tightness, how can they distinguish that from the COVID-19 symptom of difficulty breathing, versus maybe just being a sign of stress that a lot of us are feeling now? And secondly, if you have a runny nose or some sniffles, should they not worry at all?

BARRY BLOOM: [LAUGHS] Well, let me just establish my credentials. I am not a physician. I’m a researcher and a PhD. So, what I say should be taken with a grain of salt.

But having looked at the case descriptions, both from China and from the first cases written up in the US, a runny nose is not characteristic of this infection. Tightness of the chest, the kind of things that you would expect with stress, is not a characteristic symptom. But really difficulty breathing, heavy breathing, not feeling you’re getting enough air in and oxygen is a sign that really you need to see or consult someone in medicine.

This is concurrent with a flu epidemic which we are taking for granted every year that kills an awful lot of people and makes an awful lot sick. So, the challenge is, can one simply by clinical symptoms distinguish the new coronavirus infection from influenza? And my colleagues say that’s very different clinically. And that’s why we need testing, testing, testing.

Q: Thank you.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Thank you very much for doing this call. I had a couple of questions. One is that we’ve seen different estimates of mortality rates around the world for this disease. And the most recent one, I think, was a preprint and then a paper in Nature, I think, today saying that the mortality rate in China was 1.4%, which is lower than previous estimates.

So, I wanted to ask you, first of all, what you think of that– how 1.4% sounds to you as a possible mortality rate for China and for the world overall. And generally, how long do you think it’s going to be until we really understand what the death rate is?

BARRY BLOOM: So, I may sound like a broken record that you’ve heard before. But the case fatality rate depends on two things, one of which is pretty easy to figure out, which is how many people die. In some places, it’s not always clear whether they die of this infection, or influenza, or something else. So, there’s a certain amount of uncertainty about just counting people who die in a given region in the middle of an epidemic.

The second, and much more difficult, is the rate depends on how many people of those infected actually die. And we have figures from China. And I think everyone would agree that not everybody was tested. So, we actually don’t know what the denominator is. And the more people who get tested, usually, the lower the case fatality rate is.

So, if you remember H1N1 in Mexico, the initial reports– case fatality rate were 5% to 10%. And that was mostly because they were looking at people who were sick, very sick, and in hospitals. But as the epidemiology played out retrospectively and one tackled how many people had any medical problem that could be related to an infection with flu, it went down to 0.07%.

So, the case fatality rate really depends on knowing the denominator. And without testing a very wide range of people, both symptomatic and asymptomatic, we tend always to get a higher number, which is the most frightening number. For the modeling studies, people that I’ve looked at– I’m modeling at about 1%. And it may drop down quite dramatically if we actually knew how many people were infected and not sick at all.

Q: Thank you very much. I wonder if I could ask you another question sort of following up on something you said a little bit earlier about, there would be bursts of outbreaks. I sort of wonder how you see things playing out globally. I mean, we’ve got many areas of this country and the world kind of locked down or semi-locked down. And until we have either an adequate treatment or a vaccine we’re going to risk– assuming that the virus is not going to be eliminated at this point, what do you think will have to be done until that point?

I mean, if you take your foot off the gas and let people go back to work and run around and mill around, and you have possible outbreaks, you may start more spread, even around the world. So, what do you see happening or having to be done until we’ve reached the point where we really can stop it and prevent it?

BARRY BLOOM: I think you’ve asked a key question. And this is different from many other epidemics, not least because this is a really virulent strain of coronavirus. And it is one that we have had no prior experience to. So as bad as flu is, flu comes around every year. More or less everybody has had a flu at some time and has some immunological imprints that may help us make a response, that may not keep us totally from being sick, but at least protects us to some degree every year against flu. We are totally naive to this infectious disease.

And the only way to become protected is either to be vaccinated– and we have no vaccine– or to have become infected and hope that even a low-level infection will generate a protective immune response. And we will be protected for some period of time. So, we’re in the first round, since nobody has been protected against this in the past, of being a globally highly susceptible population. And the question really is– and for this, China has been the laboratory for understanding this disease– what happens as they gradually reduce the restraints on people working, going back to the factories, moving around within cities, and moving out of Hubei and around other parts of China?

So, we know there are– while there were 60,000 cases in Wuhan, places like Guangzhou and Shanghai that had people that had, previous to that, come into their towns with infections, were able to keep the numbers down to the hundreds. So, knowing what’s coming and moving quickly– speed is of the essence. Getting the tools which we, regrettably, don’t still have in the states– to identify everybody and test their contacts. We have the potential– perhaps not as draconian as shutting down the entire province in China of 60 million people. But we have the potential as was done in Korea, for example, of having huge amounts of testing, finding who’s positive, even if they’re not sick, and isolating them. Because even if you’re not sick, if you’re infected and transmit, everybody’s going to transmit between 2 and 2.5 new people. And that number continues exponentially to double.

So, the answer is we would know better what to expect if we actually knew how many people in this country and in each region was infected. And the question is, how long can we sustain being tightly constrained as we are in the States, with the proviso that is really hard for people, and certainly me, to understand– every state sets its own rules, not the federal government. So, if Boston is closed down in Massachusetts, someone in Wheeling, West Virginia doesn’t have to be. And we’re going to have a great difficulty in predicting for the country what happens.

And that leads to the final long-winded answer to your question. China’s biggest problem right now is importing cases that are flying in from other countries. They’ve really done a job at bringing their own epidemic to low level. They’re, I believe, expecting there will be bursts of outbreaks. But they’re going to be getting new imports from people who are healthy when they get on the plane, and two or three days later turn out to have this virus. I think they’re tooled up to deal with that.

But within the United States, if there are outbreaks we are not currently unable to move by car or truck or plane to any other part of the country. We will have to put out many fires– hopefully small– once we have enough of the diagnostic tools to be able to know who has this infection and whom not.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Hi, thanks for doing this call. Can you speak a little bit about seasonality. What are the chances– I know this is brand new. But what are the chances that this coronavirus will act like other ones and transmission might dissipate a bit in the summer months? And what does that mean for the health system in terms of potentially buying time for doctors and hospitals to catch up? Thanks.

BARRY BLOOM: It, too, is a wonderful question. And the answer is nobody knows for sure. I think that’s a clear cut and certain answer. Nobody knows how this particular viral strain will respond.

There are some studies in comparisons of the infection in northern China versus Hong Kong, although it’s wintertime there as well. And there doesn’t seem to be a huge temperature and humidity change between those two parts. But that’s probably not fair, because it’s all wintertime. We know from massive studies of influenza, it doesn’t do well in high humidity and high heat. We also know people tend to be walking around outdoors more in the summertime than in the wintertime, and how to factor all of those into what could be predicted.

And then, finally, I think our epidemiologists tend to believe that we overrate the effect of summertime and warm weather on SARS in 2003. We forget the massive public health efforts that were used to test people in Canada and in many countries around the world that really put major public health pressures against spread of the virus. It wasn’t just temperature.

So, if I had to guess, it is, from what I read from the pre-publications, likely to go down a bit, because it doesn’t like high humidity and temperature, likely not to go away, and likely to come back at some level as we spread this out, possibly as the weather cools in the fall. But nobody really knows.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Hi. Thank you for doing the call. And thank you for taking my question. There’s been a lot of discussion about how younger people are sort of being dismissive of the social distancing requirements or requests that have been put in place in many places. Yesterday, the CDC released some numbers suggesting that as many as one in five younger adults end up being sick enough to be hospitalized as a result of the coronavirus. And also, obviously, they could transmit it to older adults as well. So, I’m wondering if you could just comment on the general risk to younger adults and also why it’s important for them to comply with social distancing and other public health steps in order to prevent transmission. Thank you.

BARRY BLOOM: Again, a wonderful question. I saw the CDC report this morning. And it’s troubling at a couple levels in terms of formulating an intelligible answer. Under-20s were a very low percentage in China of people that had severe infection. And appears to be the same in Italy. And the question, then, is why it would be so high in the United States when it wasn’t seen in countries that had, at the moment, a probably greater level of infection.

I don’t know the answer. I don’t know of anyone yet who does. I’m sure CDC is looking at it. But it may also have to do with the criteria for admission to a hospital. We are much more likely to have people taken to a hospital for symptoms that are not overwhelmingly serious than in the middle of an epidemic where screening in so-called– let’s say in Shanghai, or Korea, or China, where they have special hospitals with people with fevers or possible symptoms that prevented them from getting into a hospital that had to provide acute respiratory care.

So, it may be partially deciding on who has to go to a hospital in the US that would go to a fever clinic or some other facility elsewhere, such that the numbers are not suggestive that one in five of all adolescents are likely to get serious respiratory infections. One doesn’t know. I can’t think of a biological or medical reason.

Having said that, the answer to your question is if 20-year-olds believe– in China, Italy, Korea, or here– they’re invulnerable to this infection, we know that there are 20-year-olds who’ve died in every one of those places. And they are not invulnerable any more than anyone else to this infection.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue.

Q: Thank you. I’d like to ask a sort of provincial Massachusetts question. So, we heard from Governor Charlie Baker today that they think they can do 3,500 tests a day starting early next week. And it feels like there is this kind of race going on between– can we ramp up our testing, and get enough protective equipment out there, and get people distanced enough so that the virus will go blooey here. Or will we not– as Governor Baker said, he’s trying to get ahead enough so that he can be proactive enough to head off the virus.

How are you seeing this picture, this race now, at this point? And what are the prospects?

BARRY BLOOM: I think we’re behind the curve. And if the major hospitals in Boston who’ve been begging for tests for the last three weeks or longer haven’t been able to test, we have no idea what’s going on in this state. The tests will begin. They will be hopefully aggregated, so we’ll know on a daily basis how big that curve goes. It will not be particularly epidemiologically meaningful, because we’ll be measuring what we can test for, not what’s really out there.

So, it’ll take a while before we can get systematic testing, which should be– if you want to draw the curve how bad things are, you want to know, how many people are today getting their first infection? How many people today are getting their first admission to a hospital? Those are figures that will let us think about how things are going.

So again, I take Korea as the best case, but also Singapore and Hong Kong. When they had a few dozen cases, they were testing everybody they found– all but eight contacts in the whole place of Singapore. That’s extraordinary it could be done. But they were testing vast numbers of people, not just those in acute respiratory distress, but anybody that they thought would be a contact.

And we’re in a position of hoping to have enough tests to know whether someone with acute respiratory symptoms has flu or has the new coronavirus. And we won’t get a sense of how many people are walking around able to transmit it until we have more drive-through test facilities and more people who can identify cases and contacts and have them self-quarantined.

So, we’re behind the curve. And the numbers may go up quickly. They may be scary. But in fact, we’re measuring what’s already been there for several weeks, not what we need to know, which is whether the curve is bending or not.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question in queue. Please go ahead.

Q: Hi, Dr. Bloom. Thank you so much for doing this talk. You mentioned earlier that your area of expertise is more research and not medical. And one of my questions mainly medical, but I’ll ask it anyway to see if you have a take on it. But a lot of our readers are asking us about ibuprofen and anti-inflammatory medications, and that it increases the risk of complications in those infected with the virus. Do you have a take on that? And particularly, what is it about these medications that is of any concern in the medical community?

BARRY BLOOM: I really can’t answer that. I’ve seen the reports on both sides of the ibuprofen. You know, they’re not cures of anything. So, in terms of affecting the course of the infection in general, they’re not going to make much of a difference. I think the common drug that people are now interested in doing a systematic testing of is the hydroxychloroquine, which has shown in SARS and MERS some beneficial effects. And any beneficial effect without severe side effects is better than doing nothing.

My big hope, to answer an earlier question that is related to yours, is it’s going to take a year to a year and a half at the earliest before we know whether the vaccines that are being tested are likely to be safe. And that’s a non-trivial question, because vaccines go into healthy people. Drugs go into sick people. So, you have a little bit more of a cost-benefit difference. We can’t make healthy people sick with a vaccine that hasn’t been shown to be safe. And that’s the reason vaccines will take so long.

There are some new drugs. There are lots of people working on this, repurposed drugs that have been approved for other purposes– remdesivir that seemed to work on one case of MERS. I would think that’s the quickest thing that could prevent people from the severest outcomes of the disease. But we know that transmission, or the number of viral particles, is greater at the earliest stage of disease. And the later stages of disease probably occur when the immune response is fighting the virus and lessening the number of particles, but also ravaging the body with an overreaction to the virus and the antigens that they release.

So, the immune system is complicated. And something that prevents people from being severely ill or dying is wonderful– unlikely to affect the outcome of the epidemic, unless it could be used very early on.

OPERATOR: Our next question. Please go ahead.

Q: Barry, thanks for doing this. It’s really helpful. I want to go fact screen. You mentioned at the very beginning that you, in fact, had met with the minister of health in China after SARS to discuss what they could have done better. At that point in time, they had temporarily shut down their wildlife markets. They did that temporarily in February 2020. And then they banned it.

My specific question is, when you talked to them back in 2003, did they talk about the policy of shutting down any of the wildlife markets?

BARRY BLOOM: They knew that they were a possible source of transmission. They knew that they had to shut them down for a period of time. And my understanding is both with changes of health personnel in the ministry and many revisions to the political system since then– the live markets are seen as something part of a cultural tradition and politically difficult to make go away. Everybody that I know of for many years has been saying they’re enormously dangerous for transmission of zoonoses from one animal to another animal species, and also into transmission into humans.

I don’t know why they haven’t shut them down permanently. It’s the same issue with people proposing to reduce the coal industry in the United States. It’s part of a cultural tradition that’s very hard to deal with by orders from on high.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question. Please go ahead.

Q: Hi, thank you so much for this. Looking at this week’s Imperial College London report, it suggests that the best strategy is interventions aimed at suppression. That includes social distancing and K quarantine, household quarantine. But the model predicts that even if you have effective suppression, it’s going to be followed by a big spike in cases in the fall.

I know we’ve touched on this a little bit. It offers the suggestion that intermittent social distancing is one way to deal with that. So, I want to sort of come back to this possibility of cases rising again in the fall. Can you talk about the danger of a spike happening, even if we do have successful suppression of the spread? And do you think that they’re suggestion that intermittent social distancing is something that could work to help flatten, I guess, the secondary curve at this point.

BARRY BLOOM: It’s a profoundly important question. And let me just emphasize that no one really knows that this virus will survive the summer and come back in the fall. In the beginning, the analogy was made with influenza that goes away in the fall. SARS went away in the fall. Maybe this will go away in the fall.

There is no evidential basis for that. So, everybody, including the model makers, are speculating. But they are awfully thoughtful in how they have thought about their models.

The problem is that no one other than those who’ve recovered from infection are likely to be immune. Which means that if it does persist in the fall, if it’s reintroduced, even if we could get rid of it by the summer, and new cases are occurring elsewhere in the world in travelers who come back to the States or visit the States, there is always going to be a possibility of continued bursts and outbreaks in the fall.

And the question then, do you have to deal with them– how do you deal with them? And I think the sense, as the New York Times editorial by Zeke Emanuel and his colleagues said today, it’s like going downhill on a snowy, icy road. If you put your foot on the brakes, you will crash. If you don’t put your foot on the brakes, you will crash. So, what one does is pump the brake in a kind of responsive way to see where you are at the current time.

I think that’s the model that the Imperial Group is saying. If it comes back, it will come back at a lower level than it started, because not everybody will be susceptible. And if you have to clamp it down for a bit and you have testing to see how extensive the number of sensitive people are to become infected, you’ll have a guideline and something to measure whether things are getting from the 100 level to the 1,000 level, from the 1,000 level to the 5,000 level. And you have to introduce different constraints or suppression measures, depending on how easy it is to find a few contacts in one town in Minnesota. Or you have to shut down a whole state that seems to be problematic, or reduce contacts in other ways.

So, I think the key to every decision making in policy depends on testing and having really smart people model the course of the epidemic in real time, not just by analogy to China.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Hi. Thanks for taking my question. I guess it’s kind of two parts. One, how long do you think the sorts of social distancing measures that are in place now in the US will have to be in place to prevent a surge in cases that overwhelm our health care capacity? And if we’re sort of successful in the interim, do you think that it’s possible that we could go back to a time where all we really needed to keep outbreaks from spreading is sort of widespread testing, and then isolating cases as they pop up, and tracing their contacts and isolating those? Sort of until we get a vaccine.

BARRY BLOOM: So, I believe that maintaining every level of social or personal distancing that was outlined in the Imperial College model has to be done. It starts with voluntary quarantine for anybody who thinks they may have symptoms, whether they have this or not. It means social distancing of those people who are over 70. But because of this fragmented health system in the US, every state is going to do something differently. So, making generalizations about the United States in this context becomes really very difficult.

Assuming we could have a systematic imposition of all of the above and that the leakage rate is something like 25%– that is, it’s 75% effective– the sense is that they could really turn the curve down by two or three months. It won’t go away. China didn’t go away once they turned the curve down. But that might be the time that we could release some of the constraints on people, so they could resume more normal lives.

In Korea, people still went to work. They had to get certain permissions. They had to get tested at certain checkpoints. People were removed from their households to be in fever hospitals. There are lots of ways to try to contain the people who might be ill and allow others the opportunity to go to work. And of course, everybody in China and Korea wears a mask, even before this.

I think there’s much that we could be doing during these three months that would help bend the curve to the point where, as everybody says, we protect the hospital system. I’m hopeful we could actually do more than that, to the extent that a lot of what needs to be constrained can be loosened by the fall– expecting there will be outbreaks in various places, but being prepared with testing, large numbers of people able to do contact tracing, which we don’t now have with cuts at CDC over the past many years– we can tool up to find cases if the numbers are low.

But to be absolutely honest, as I said at the beginning, models are not predictions. And nobody really knows for sure how long it would take to really lower the curve that we could live in a tolerable way, and how much can be released of all of those constraints– schools, social distancing whole populations, protecting people of 70 years of age, isolating anybody with a fever from their contacts. How long we can do that is unclear. And I think that’s a political question and a kind of solidarity question that we haven’t been tested in since the Second World War.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Thank you so much for taking the question. It actually goes along with what you were just saying. We hear a lot about contact tracing here in Florida and what they’re doing with those efforts. But as we’ve reported in the Herald, testing is still really a challenge. We’re only testing the most severe cases, the most symptomatic people, or those with known ties to travel. So, my question is, how effective can contact tracing be without that kind of widespread testing?

BARRY BLOOM: I think you’ve answered the question. Contact tracing can only work if you find, essentially, every contact. So, I would contrast, for example, at the same time, what was happening in 60,000 people being infected. And in another part of China, 200 people were infected. Guangzhou or Hong Kong or Singapore.

And the difference is once they knew what was coming, and once they had developed a diagnostic test, it works really well when you have a limited number of contacts and you can identify all of them. Once the numbers exceed the number of public health people that can find them or the number of tests you can do, it’s very difficult to work by containment of known contacts or infected. You’re working at social population level mitigation, which is locking everybody down to avoid social distancing at every level possible. So, testing really can be done best when you know what the problem is and you have enough tests for everybody.

Let me just say that we’re using a challenging molecular test that has to be done by qualified people in high tech machines to get the answer at the present time. There are tests being developed– in China, they are developed– where with a stick drive, anybody in their house could look to see whether they have been infected with the coronavirus. It will not be 100% sensitive. It will not be 100% accurate. But boy, I would really like to have a test that I could look at tomorrow and ask whether I am likely to have been infected and then could report that somewhere. And we could get everybody’s answer in without having to wait in lines and drive-through things.

So, the science is moving to the point where we can do that, not necessarily testing for the virus, but for example, testing the immune response to the virus, which starts as soon as you are infected. And a week later, whether you’re sick or not sick, you will probably have an antibody that– we know how to do very quick antibody tests for HIV and many other diseases. And they could be made household tests as we do with pregnancy and other things.

It is how to move what we know how to do in a laboratory to a commercial area where people can get– on their own, be empowered to do their own testing. That would be the ideal for me. And that’s not going to be tomorrow in the United States.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Thanks for taking my call. I’m seeing a few things having to do with transmission and whether the virus moves more through the air or is spreading more on surfaces. I wonder what you can tell us about what scientists have figured out on that and what it means for public health recommendations.

BARRY BLOOM: A wonderful question.

To answer your question, that was published– we can go in the New England Journal paper where scientists actually did experiments to measure, if you put so many viral particles down on cardboard, or copper, or plastic, or steel, how long can you find viable viruses there? And the answer is– how much stays in the air? And the answer is a matter of minutes to hours. About 35 or 40 minutes you lose half of the viability. So, this is an exponential decay. It’s not a straight line. It’s a half-life.

And so, in that context, it’s hours in the air if you’re in the same room with somebody. If it’s on a surface, it can be up to 27 hours as a common number of how far they carried out the test and find some level of virus, but much lower that was put down. Cardboard did better in terms of reducing the time the virus remained viable, for reasons that, at least, those authors had no idea, nor do I. We know that viruses in general like flu don’t survive well on fabric, clothes, as they would in surfaces that are hard.

But we’re talking about the persistence in some places for a matter of days on surfaces, which means disinfection is something that should be done at a minimum, in places like factories where there is lots of surface contact of goods and things, as often as possible.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Hi, Barry. I have a general immunology question. We’ve been reading about NBA players who are infected but don’t have any symptoms. And then other people who become very, very ill. Is this an unusual characteristic of COVID-19? Or is this typical of any disease?

BARRY BLOOM: I don’t think it’s typical of any disease. But I think there is a gradation in respiratory diseases. For example, in my favorite disease, tuberculosis, something like 2/3 of the world’s population, perhaps, has been infected with the bug that causes of TB. Either they cure it, or it remains latent, and they’re not sick ever. But at some point, some of them, particularly, with may become immunosuppressed either by chemotherapy, or by HIV, or their immune system wanes in old age, when their immune system shuts down– your ability to control a persisting infection goes down. So, in this context, it isn’t terribly surprising there’s a huge gradation.

In one of the key questions, which is an immunologic question is, is there any way to predict anyone who comes into a fever hospital, or a clinic, or a hospital for testing, can you sort who’s going to get really sick and develop a cytokine storm and be life threatening, and who is just going to have a bad case of this viral infection and recover after 10 days? And the answer is, we have no test for that. There is a hint that there might be certain cytokines that– looking at China data, one unpublished archived paper preprint suggests there might be such a thing. And I learned that there are investigators at Harvard hospitals that are interested in pursuing that.

And that would be very helpful for hospitals to know who’s going to get sick, but isn’t going to need a ventilator, or respirator, or extracorporeal oxygen treatment. That would free up some of the major hospital interventions that we’re worried about running out of. Research to be done.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Thank you, Barry. What would you tell providers in the community– physicians and nurse practitioners– who are not in the acute care setting? What roles are they playing in this pandemic? And what can we tell them to help them help their patients?

BARRY BLOOM: I think the first priority I would have is how they can protect themselves. And this is where testing is so terribly important. It’s one thing to know how to deal with a patient that you know has been infected and might be at a risk. And you would take certain precautionary steps in dealing with them. But if you’re a school nurse and you have no idea whether your kids who are healthy are able to transmit the virus to you, or if you’re a nurse in a hospital worrying whether you’re in a position to transfer the nurse to your kids, those are serious questions that really worry the hell out of me.

And the protective tools that we have available to people at the second line– the high school nurses and practical nurses and home nurses– they’re not there yet. And it would be really helpful if everybody knew who was carrying the virus for 10 days and stayed up and had to go somewhere. Tell someone that you’re in contact with, I might have this virus. Please protect yourself. That would be ideal. But for that, we really need testing, personal protective equipment, and masks.

And I would start with masks. I’m not the biggest fan in masks, but there are a few scientific experiments that I can’t dismiss that suggest that surgical masks are not all that bad. And in fact, in some studies, two studies, in hospitals, in seven medical centers, they were essentially as good as N-95 masks. I wouldn’t count on that. But it’s better than nothing. And in this case, anything that would protect the frontline people strikes me as something they try to utilize.

OPERATOR: Next question. Please go ahead.

Q: Hi, Professor Bloom. Can you talk a little bit about the recent government directives concerning nonessential surgery? How nonessential is being defined, who’s defining it. Is this something that’s being determined on a case by case basis?

BARRY BLOOM: It’s a terribly [LAUGHS] important question to which I don’t have a very good answer. My sense from the infectious disease people who are not surgeons, obviously, is that there is no general guideline that the federal government has put out as deciding what is essential and what is nonessential. Hospitals are being left, as I understand it, at least in most states, to decide on their own. And I have heard there’s a clamoring in the network of scientific communication.

Every hospital, not least for liability purposes, but for real life purposes, would like guidelines on how to tell people who have a pain here and an appointment to look at their annual melanoma reading– to tell them what’s essential and what’s not. And we don’t have those guidelines that I’m aware of.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Hey, doctor. Thanks for having this chat. My question is more to do with public health and panic buying. Here in Ohio and across the country, we’re seeing a surge in sales from everything from food, to hand sanitizer, and even guns and ammunition. From a public health standpoint, what are the concerns with panic buying?

BARRY BLOOM: They make things worse. That’s the best that I can say. Because the most mobile, affluent, healthy people are the ones who are able to do the panic buying. And the most vulnerable, those in the elderly population, those not quite so mobile, those that don’t own cars, are the most vulnerable. And this is a question that, really– I heard the president’s speech yesterday and the comments that didn’t include this today. This is where citizenship really counts. This is where solidarity of– we’re all in this together and having 10 more rolls of toilet paper or disinfectant in my household isn’t going to make anybody any safer. But it’s going to put other people at risk.

And until we can get people to really think about, yes, protect you and your family first. But you don’t have to buy off the store in every cereal. I can’t get cereal in my local market. This is a matter of my view of what citizenship is about. And protecting everybody, not just yourself, is what being a good citizen is.

And I know it sounds platitudinous. But that’s the spirit that I have heard from colleagues in Korea and after the fact in China. There’s less complaining than you would imagine about social distancing. Because there is this sense that what I spare for myself may make available to somebody else. We need that spirit. And we need leaders that every level, not just political and government, but entertainment, and medicine, and elsewhere, to encourage people to be good citizens.

OPERATOR: Next question.

Q: Barry, I want to go back to the wet markets for a second. Do you think for the infectious disease researchers worldwide, knowing what they know about the wet markets, should join forces and call for the shutting down of all the wet markets across Southeast Asia and China? Because the health risks are there. People know about it.

BARRY BLOOM: Oh, people do know about it. And they’ve known about it for a very long time. I would direct the question at a different level. I’m not sure the government of China is going to listen to a bunch of public health people who write a petition. I think they would have to listen to the World Health Organization. And I am not aware– I’m not that in touch with what’s going on at the moment at WHO– I am not aware that that’s been a major thrust to get WHO to take a position on it.

WHO doesn’t like to take a position that is targeted to individual countries. And since there are countries in Africa that do have open markets and sell things like non-human primates for food, bushmeat, in essence, it is possible that in this occasion without directly targeting it to China they could get the World Health Assembly to pass a resolution. And I’d love to see the United States of America government, which is represented there, to support such a resolution.

We should not have open markets where species of different animals are in constant contact with one another. It’s too great a hazard to the whole world to allow that cultural tradition to continue.

OPERATOR: This concludes the question and answer session. I will now turn it back over to Dr. Bloom for any closing remarks.

BARRY BLOOM: I am most appreciative of the thoughtfulness of the questions and, obviously, the knowledge of the people who asked them, particularly in the press. I hope the answers were helpful. And I am hopeful that this series of broadcasts from the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health will continue to be helpful to you in your work at informing America of how we can respond to this epidemic. Thank you all for your input.

This concludes the Thursday, March 19 press conference.

注意这篇对话录的发布时间是2020年的3月,这个时间点,曾经与他合影的英雄科学家早已成功登陆美国。

那么这个著名的教授是谁,我们来看看:

当然令人吃惊的是他还有另外一个身份:“哈佛大学中国基金”指导委员会的重要成员,有没有震惊到?怎么绕到哈佛大学身上了?一切又是这么神奇。

所以,如果美国的FBI或者记者质疑美女英雄科学家的爆料内容的真实性可以不用远赴香港去查证了,直接询问这位著名的生物病毒学家就可以了,闫梦丽是否是香港大学公共卫生学院的职员,所从事的研究是否重要,对CCP病毒的指控和披露是否真实,去询问这位专家就可以了。

关于这个“哈佛大学中国基金”的挖掘故事还有很多,我们将在第三季中专门通过一篇文章进行系统挖掘和解读,当然,这个基金一定和P4实验室产生某种联系。在这里只小小的爆一个小料:

2016年这个基金会在哈佛大学商学院组织了一场轰动全人类的讲演,讲演的嘉宾就是时任海航董事长兼创始人陈锋先生!

以下为视频链接地址:https://youtu.be/MH9m6pAEHcI

DT挖掘机真心的希望美国人认真研究一下这个视频,因为陈锋这个浑身充满CCP丑恶基因的所谓大人物针对美国人的这次讲演基本代表了CCP对待美国和美国人的基本态度和认知水平。

6 一切都已开始

我们把这一季的总序言放在最后,并以这篇序幕性的挖掘文章再次致敬我们的美女英雄科学家。

《P4实验室系列 第三季》总序言

DT挖掘战队的《P4实验室系列 第二季》十一篇挖掘调查文章已经推出。在此,DT挖掘机首先感谢正义科学家们的参与和解读,没有他们的参与和耐心解读,DT不会理解那些抽象的名词和隐藏在科技技术之后的真相和秘密。同时感谢参与第二季翻译的所有人员,因为第二季翻译工作的难度之大、任务之重是前所未有的。更要感谢七哥和爆料革命的战友们,感谢香港的勇士,是七哥和爆料革命以及香港的勇士给了DT挖掘战队进行CCP病毒挖掘的勇气、信心和灵感。最后感谢善良的美国人,感谢他们坚定的信仰所折射出的善良以及对中国人民的友好。感恩美国,这个上帝之子。

《P4实验室系列 第三季》的构思实际上是在第二季的工作过程中就已经完成了,在与正义科学家的讨论中,我们已经逐步明确仅仅一个第二季的十一篇文章来揭示P4实验室的真相,是远远不够的,这只是冰山的一角。其后续的工作,不仅仅包括我们在第二季中预报的那些外传,更主要的是依据我们所拥有的庞大的挖掘资料,继续梳理和解读,深刻的挖掘CCP病毒产生和使用的过程,P4实验室背后的秘密。在这一季中,我们的正义科学家们依旧和DT挖掘机战队通力合作,对一些深奥难懂的生物医学名词、概念和涉及到技术问题进行详细解读。

中共建党99年盗国60余年建设的这个体系太庞大了,绝对不是一季、两季可以说得清的。这需要DT战队投入时间和经历不断地去挖掘,所以到底有多少季,不清楚,只能说“一切已经开始!”。

在第二季中,DT已经声明过,进行挖掘的全部资料来自公开的互联网资料查询,意思就是,DT没有也没有使用来自内部的情报,只是根据这些公开的资料进行系统的梳理、统计和分析解读,当然验证这些资料的真实性不是DT的工作。基于此,所有DT的推论和结论,读者可以当成一个故事来理解,也可以视为真实发生的事实真相,自己去加以逻辑判断和验证。其影响,DT挖掘战队不负任何责任。

当然DT挖掘战队的挖掘工作是十分具有价值的,其价值就是梳理CCP进行战略行动和布局的思维路径,就是剥开CCP邪恶行为的思维逻辑本质,明白了这个本质CCP邪恶魔鬼就不可怕了。“知己知彼、百战百胜”,在与CCP作战的过程中,很多战友包括很多机构和国家是处于面对一种“黑盒”(BLACKBOX)的状态来面对CCP。关于这一点,DT可能要多啰嗦几句。所谓“黑盒”,就是你不了解它,由此产生的恐惧和犹豫以及错误的判断。七哥所说的“唯真不破”就是解决这个问题破解“黑盒”的方法。

以美国为代表的文明社会与CCP的这场决战从本质上就是一场信息战,CCP构筑防火墙使用蓝金黄手段的目的就是制造这种“黑盒”,制造一种信息的不对称,而制造信息的不对称则是信息战的关键。例如使用防火墙不仅屏蔽了民众对真实世界的了解,对真相的了解,通过官方宣传系统的洗脑沦落为党国的奴隶、奴才,更主要的是屏蔽了美国对中共的大量真实情报来源,导致美国对中共国的判断建立在一个虚假信息或者说真假难辨信息基础上,这种信息的不对称最终会影响中美战略关系决策的美方的决策和判断。更可怕的是会影响美国的民意甚至美国的大选及政府的政治走向。

在DT挖掘战队进行本次挖掘任务的时候,发生了以所谓大量“觉醒义工”集体整合媒体攻击文贵先生和爆料革命战友的所谓揭骗事件就是一个典型的面对“黑盒”信息不对称的信息战案例。

我们且不去揭示曾宏之流潜藏的特务身份先分裂法轮功迫害海外民运人士进而针对郭文贵进行抹黑陷害的行径,仅仅从其所做的事情和所谓的“绿豆蝇”们举报、新闻曝光的行动上可以看出这些伪类们在面对CCP和美国以及文贵先生领导的爆料革命时信息不对称,就是他们面对的是一个黑盒。他们既不了解美国、也不了解中共,更不了解爆料革命,这是极其可悲和可怜的。当然他们制造种种事端的目的也是利用许多人对美国文化、制度、法律、体制的无知制造新的信息不对称条件下的错误判断所导致的混乱事端。所以,对于某些人的“挖掘我”的叫板,DT是不屑一顾的。而推出的关于曾宏的挖掘以及关于绿豆蝇的挖掘就是要提醒当事者和战友注意要先看清CCP这个黑盒到底是什么。从曾宏的经历中可以明确的知道一个特务潜伏到美国成为民运人士的路径:“包装成维权人士引导维权打压维权”“发表反共文章获得政治资本混入法轮功、政治避难获取身份和地位、成为民运积极分子发声分化法轮功”“勇敢挺郭混进爆料革命队伍,制造事端打击爆料革命”,注意,这个路径不是曾宏之流个人发明的路径或者人设,而是CCP一贯的手法,而曾宏的三性家奴的表现则完美地证明了他只是一个可怜的任务执行者,“一切都是组织的安排”。而DT针对绿豆蝇的挖掘推文更是要揭示CCP利用海外留学生进行海外大外宣的方法和手段,关于具体实施的方法和路径的深刻挖掘在第三季中会涉及到。可怜的是这些被利用者还在沉睡,不知道自己只是一枚小小的棋子。DT在挖掘中真心地提醒这些伪类面对这些“黑盒”,有时间去读读爆料革命的文章,因为他们对CCP、对美国、对爆料革命都是一脸懵懂,一窍不通,在整个世界都在重新审视和面对CCP的大环境下主动地做CCP的帮凶其下场和后果可想而知。

所以通过系列挖掘文章让所有人把CCP这个“黑箱”变成眼中的“白箱”,看清CCP的本质和这场生化武器病毒战争的真相是DT挖掘战队的核心目的。

当然,在整个第三季挖掘之前,还有两个基础工作要做。

基础工作A 对第二季的总结

我们先对第二季的内容做一个系统的总结,在第二季里,我们提出了一些系统化的观点和理解,这是我们整个挖掘工作的基础。主要包括以下内容:

A 在挖掘内容上,注意时间跨度和思考中共行动的根本初衷和原因。注意特殊的时间点和关键的变化。

B CCP病毒作为一种生化基因武器的出现不是偶然的,CCP病毒绝对不是自然产生,而是来自中共的实验室。

C 使用ABC作为战略性武器对美国进行战略决战是中共这个组织的集体决策;根本原因在于这个组织在价值观上与美国为代表的文明世界的背离;其邪恶的本质和对财富的抢劫野心必然导致其最终要与美国进行战略决战;这个战略是在八九六四之后由江泽民为代表的上海帮集体继承邓小平等上一代领导人的遗志而完成的;实施的方式就是通过国家经济的发展的借口和手段攫取财富,通过国家开放、经济文化国际交流的手段盗取美国的科技技术从而集中经济、科研实力发展信息技术为基础的高科技为代表的战略军用设施和武器,将决战的手段和方法定位为《超限战》。

D 这个战略的核心推动者是中科院和北大清华所代表的高校系统。而掌控者则是上海帮。通过这种战略,完成了高科技控制军队、高科技控制国家、高科技控制财富、高科技控制权力从而实现江山永固、财富永续、家族永旺的战略任务。

E 对美国的蓝金黄和3F计划露出狰狞的面目,蓝金黄是手段方法,3F是目的。两个计划都是具体实施和行动的方案,并且已经发生。

F CCP病毒只是“ABC”战略武器研发中的一种病毒,中共国还有更多的武器和病毒。CCP病毒作为终极生化武器的研发始于2003年的SARS,成型于2016年。其国内的主要研发者是武汉大学的P3实验室也就是武汉大学的病毒学国家重点实验室,最终病毒武器的接管者是武汉病毒研究所的P4实验室。P4实验室的真正管理者是以军事医学科学院为核心单位的军方文职人员。

G CCP病毒及“ABC”战略武器的研发动用了几乎整个中共国的核心科研力量,通过“知识创新工程”等国家项目进行实施和部署,刻意混淆民用与军用的界限,掩盖其真相,目的是迷惑美国为主的国际社会和对内愚弄民众。

H CCP病毒生化武器研制和投放超级战队是一个国际化的战队,其布局实施自2003甚至更早就已经开始。其核心是法中基金会和法国的巴斯德机构系统。

I CCP病毒生化武器库的战略资源储备十分庞大,不仅具有最大的病毒毒株储备,而且在实验动物、实验室等硬件条件、研发软件、基础数据库、生物医学人才等方面进行了长期储备。

以上各个观点是第二季进行挖掘和分析的重点结论。

基础工作B 对中共这种病毒战略认识的重要性

之所以在第三季的基础工作中再次强调对中共这种病毒战略认识的重要性,原因就像《P4实验室第二季》所揭示的那样,ABC(核武器、生物武器、化学武器)自一开始就是中共选择的针对美国进行战略决战的国家战略武器,这一决策是CCP第一代、第二代领导集体决策产生的,由江泽民所代表的第三代领导通过全部国家经济战略的军事化、超限战思想而具体实施的。换句话说,CCP病毒不是偶然产生的,不是某个疯狂科学家和政治野心家的个人行为,更不可能是实验室的泄漏而发生。可以肯定地说,ABC武器的研发就是针对美国。

只有明白并理解和高度重视这一点也就是高度关注中共ABC武器的战略目标一定是美国这一点才能够理清“蓝金黄计划”“3F计划”“千人计划”等各种计划中的逻辑和做法的本质核心,也会看清CCP病毒、芬太尼、北斗计划、5G、防火墙、海外各种协会、学会、基金会、孔子学院的本质。

所以,江泽民在任军委主席期间制定的“以信息化为基础的ABC高技术发展战略武器分三步走”的国家军事战略是第三季挖掘的核心目标和基础。而在这个基础上我们寻找线索进行发掘,发现了大量的资料和令人瞠目结舌的事实真相。而这些事实真相背后的逻辑以及彰显出的路径又一次验证了郭文贵先生爆料视频内容情报的准确性。所以我们有理由相信江泽民延期军委主席的任职不仅仅只是权力斗争那么简单,而似乎更多地是组织的集体决定,是为了确保CCP这个战略目标的实现和对美国决战指挥权力的平稳过渡。当然,我们并不否认这里面具有权力争斗的内涵,因为如果不弄权不内斗那就不是真正地中共了。

在这个决定整个人类命运的伟大时刻,我们欣喜地看到我们的美女英雄科学家出境了,我们坚信,七哥、香港义士、郝董、叶钊颖、英雄科学家的出现只是开始,因为正义必胜,黑暗终将散去。

让我们再次以美女英雄科学家真挚的微笑画面作为本文的结束篇:

一切已经开始。

敬请期待下回分解。

本文终。

编辑:【喜马拉雅战鹰团】

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81301527
6 月 之前

共匪灭亡已经加速,感谢DT团队的每一位成员战友,是你们和文贵先生拯救了世界和人类

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yiwu
7 月 之前

感谢DT和挖掘团队! 海量的关于P4实验室和冠状病毒相关的信息,脉络分析的非常清楚了. 支持翻译成英文的系列报道,绝对的普利策奖水平.

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DT

7月 18日