滅共四騎士演講之二:FBI局長雷哈德遜演講全文(完整版)(2020.07.07)

新聞簡述:2020年7月7日,美國聯邦調查局局長克里斯托弗.雷(Christopher Wray)在哈德遜研究所發表演講,全面闡述中共對美國經濟和國家安全的威脅。

中英文對照演講全文

China’s Attempt to Influence U.S. Institutions

《中國試圖影響美國機構》

Christopher Wray, FBI Director

美國聯邦調查局局長克里斯托弗.雷

Hudson Institute

哈德遜研究所

July 7, 2020

2020年7月7日

It’s the people of the United States who are the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history.

美國人民是中國盜竊活動的受害者,盜竊規模之大,已構成人類歷史上最大的財富轉移之一。

If you are an American adult, it is more likely than not that China has stolen your personal data.

如果你是一個美國成年人,中國很可能已經竊取過你的個人數據。

In 2017, the Chinese military conspired to hack Equifax and made off with the sensitive personal information of 150 million Americans—we’re talking nearly half of the American population and most American adults—and as I’ll discuss in a few moments, this was hardly a standalone incident.

2017年,中國軍方密謀黑掉了信用評級公司艾可飛(Equifax)的數據庫,盜取了1.5億美國人的敏感個人信息——我們談的是近一半美國人口和大多數成年人——正如我將在一會兒談論到的,這不是一個獨立的事件。

Our data isn’t the only thing at stake here—so are our health, our livelihoods, and our security.

並不只是我們的數據處於危險之中——我們的健康、生計和安全也同樣如此。

We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are related to China. And at this very moment, China is working to compromise American health care organizations, pharmaceutical companies, and academic institutions conducting essential COVID-19 research.

我們FBI現在已經到了每10個小時就會立案一個新的與中國有關的反間諜案件的地步。全美目前進行的近5000起FBI反間諜案件中,一半與CCP有關。此時此刻,CCP仍在致力於損害美國的醫療機構、制藥公司以及進行新冠病毒重要研究的學術機構。

But before I go on, let me be clear: This is not about the Chinese people, and it’s certainly not about Chinese Americans. Every year, the United States welcomes more than 100,000 Chinese students and researchers into this country. For generations, people have journeyed from China to the United States to secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and their families—and our society is better for their contributions. So, when I speak of the threat from China, I mean the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party.

在繼續下面的演講之前,我得強調一下,這是CCP做的惡,與中國人民無關、與在美華人無關。每年,美國都歡迎超過10萬名中國學生和研究人員進入美國。世世代代,人們從中國來到美國,為自己和家人爭取自由之福,而我們的社會因他們的貢獻而變得更好。所以,當我談到來自中國的威脅時,我指的是中國政府和中國共產黨。

The Chinese Regime and the Scope of Its Ambitions

中共政權及其野心

To understand this threat and how we must act to respond to it, the American people should remember three things.

為了理解這種威脅,以及怎樣採取行動來應對它,美國人民應該記住三件事。

First: We need to be clear-eyed about the scope of the Chinese government’s ambition. China—the Chinese Communist Party—believes it is in a generational fight to surpass our country in economic and technological leadership.

第一:認清中共的野心。中國,就是中共,相信他們正處於一場在經濟和技術上全面超越美國的世紀之戰中。

That is sobering enough. But it’s waging this fight not through legitimate innovation, not through fair and lawful competition, and not by giving their citizens the freedom of thought and speech and creativity that we treasure here in the United States. Instead, China is engaged in a whole-of-state effort to become the world’s only superpower by any means necessary.

這足以令人警醒的了。但它打這場戰爭的方法不是通過合法創新,不是通過公平合法的競爭,也不是通過給予其公民思想、言論和創造力的自由,而這些正是我們在美國所珍視的。相反,中國正盡舉國之力,不擇手段地要成為世界上唯一的超級大國。

A Diverse and Multi-Layered Approach

多元化和多層面的戰略

The second thing the American people need to understand is that China uses a diverse range of sophisticated techniques—everything from cyber intrusions to corrupting trusted insiders. They’ve even engaged in outright physical theft. And they’ve pioneered an expansive approach to stealing innovation through a wide range of actors—including not just Chinese intelligence services but state-owned enterprises, ostensibly private companies, certain kinds of graduate students and researchers, and a whole variety of other actors working on their behalf.

美國人民需要瞭解的第二件事是,中國使用五花八門的陰謀詭計——從網絡入侵到藍金黃內部人員,不一而足。他們甚至進行直接的實物偷竊。他們還採用了一種全民參與的方法竊取創新成果,不僅包括中國情報部門,還包括國有企業、表面上的私營公司、某些類型的研究生和研究人員,以及代表他們工作的其他各種各樣的參與者。

Economic Espionage

經濟間諜活動

To achieve its goals and surpass America, China recognizes it needs to make leaps in cutting-edge technologies. But the sad fact is that instead of engaging in the hard slog of innovation, China often steals American intellectual property and then uses it to compete against the very American companies it victimized—in effect, cheating twice over. They’re targeting research on everything from military equipment to wind turbines to rice and corn seeds.

為了實現自己的目標並超越美國,中國認識到它需要在尖端技術上實現飛躍。但可悲的事實是,中國沒有進行艱苦的創新,而是經常竊取美國的知識產權,然後用它來與它受害的美國公司競爭,而此實質是雙重欺騙。他們將目標重點鎖定在從軍事裝備到風力渦輪機、水稻和玉米種子等各種研究上。

Through its talent recruitment programs, like the so-called Thousand Talents Program, the Chinese government tries to entice scientists to secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China—even if that means stealing proprietary information or violating our export controls and conflict-of-interest rules.

中國政府通過收買人才,如所謂的「千人計劃」,誘使科學家們將我們的知識和創新秘密帶回中國,即使這意味著竊取專利信息或違反我們的出口管制和利益衝突規則。

Take the case of scientist Hongjin Tan, for example, a Chinese national and American lawful permanent resident. He applied to China’s Thousand Talents Program and stole more than $1 billion—that’s with a 「b」—worth of trade secrets from his former employer, an Oklahoma-based petroleum company, and got caught. A few months ago, he was convicted and sent to prison.

以科學家譚宏進為例,他就是一位中國公民和美國合法永久居民。他申請加入了「千人計劃」,從他的前雇主那裡竊取了價值超過10億美元(注意,是「億」元)的商業機密,於一家俄克拉荷馬州的石油公司,然後被抓獲。幾個月前,他被判有罪,並被送進監獄。

Or there’s the case of Shan Shi, a Texas-based scientist, also sentenced to prison earlier this year. Shi stole trade secrets regarding syntactic foam, an important naval technology used in submarines. Shi, too, had applied to China’s Thousand Talents Program, and specifically pledged to 「digest」 and 「absorb」 the relevant technology in the United States. He did this on behalf of Chinese state-owned enterprises, which ultimately planned to put the American company out of business and take over the market.

或者另一個案例,位於德克薩斯州的科學家石山,今年早些時候也被判刑入獄。石山竊取了有關復合薄膜塑料技術的商業機密,這是一項應用於潛艇的重要海軍技術。石山也申請了中國的「千人計劃」,並特別承諾「消化」和「吸收」美國的相關技術。他這樣做是代表著中國國有企業,而他們最終計劃將美國公司淘汰出局,佔領市場。

In one of the more galling and egregious aspects of the scheme, the conspirators actually patented in China the very manufacturing process they’d stolen, and then offered their victim American company a joint venture using its own stolen technology. We’re talking about an American company that spent years and millions of dollars developing that technology, and China couldn’t replicate it—so, instead, it paid to have it stolen.

該計謀的一個更駭人聽聞和令人發指的方面,是共謀者甚至在中國將偷來的製造工藝申請專利,然後與被偷盜的美國公司成立一家合資企業,使用自己的被盜技術。我們說的是一家美國公司,它花了多年時間和數百萬美元開發了這項技術,而中國無法複製它,所以就花錢把它偷走了。

And just two weeks ago, Hao Zhang was convicted of economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and conspiracy for stealing proprietary information about wireless devices from two U.S. companies. One of those companies had spent over 20 years developing the technology Zhang stole.

就在兩周前,張浩因從兩家美國公司竊取無線設備的專有信息而被判處經濟間諜罪、盜竊商業機密罪和共謀罪。其中一家公司花了20多年時間開發張浩所竊取的技術。

These cases were among more than a thousand investigations the FBI has into China’s actual and attempted theft of American technology—which is to say nothing of over a thousand more ongoing counterintelligence investigations of other kinds related to China. We’re conducting these kinds of investigations in all 56 of our field offices. And over the past decade, we’ve seen economic espionage cases with a link to China increase by approximately 1,300 percent.

這些案件是聯邦調查局對中國實際和企圖盜竊美國技術的一千多起調查中的一部分,更不用說還有一千多起與中國有關的其它類型的反情報調查正在進行中。我們的56個外地辦事處都在進行此類調查。在過去十年里,我們看到與中國有關的經濟間諜案件增加了大約1300%。

The stakes could not be higher, and the potential economic harm to American businesses and the economy as a whole almost defies calculation.

「千人計劃」真是無本萬利的賭注,其對美國企業和整個經濟的潛在傷害,幾乎無法計算。

Clandestine Efforts

秘密活動

As National Security Advisor O’Brien discussed in his June remarks, the Chinese government is also making liberal use of hacking to steal our corporate and personal data—and they’re using both military and non-state hackers to do it. The Equifax intrusion I mentioned just a few moments ago, which led to the indictment of Chinese military personnel, was hardly the only time China stole the sensitive personal information of huge numbers of the American public.

正如國家安全顧問奧布賴恩在6月份的講話中所討論的,中國政府也在隨心所欲的利用黑客來竊取我們的公司和個人數據,而且他們利用軍方和非國家黑客兩種方式。我剛才提到的艾可飛(Equifax)入侵事件,導致中國軍事人員被起訴,這根本不是中國唯一的一次竊取大量美國公眾的敏感個人信息。

For example, did any of you have health insurance through Anthem or one of its associated insurers? In 2015, China’s hackers stole the personal data of 80 million of that company’s current and former customers.

例如,在場各位中有人購買了偉彭醫療網(Anthem)或其關聯保險公司的醫療保險嗎?2015 年,中國的黑客竊取了該公司8000萬名現有和以前客戶的個人數據。

Or maybe you’re a federal employee—or you used to be one, or you applied for a government job once, or a family member or roommate did. Well, in 2014, China’s hackers stole more than 21 million records from OPM, the federal government’s Office of Personnel Management.

或者你現在是一名聯邦僱員,或者你曾經是一名聯邦僱員,或者你曾經申請了一次政府工作,或者你的家庭成員或室友申請了。好吧,2014年,中國的黑客從聯邦政府人事管理辦公室(OPM)竊取了超過2100萬條記錄。

Why are they doing this? First, China has made becoming an artificial intelligence world leader a priority, and these kinds of thefts feed right into China’s development of artificial intelligence tools.

他們為什麼要這麼做?首先,中國已經把成為人工智能的世界領導者作為首要任務,這類盜竊行為正好為中國發展人工智能工具提供幫助。

Compounding the threat, the data China stole is of obvious value as they attempt to identify people for secret intelligence gathering. On that front, China is using social media platforms—the same ones Americans use to stay connected or find jobs—to identify people with access to our government’s sensitive information and then target those people to try to steal it.

使威脅雪上加霜的是,中國竊取的數據具有明顯的戰略價值,因為他們試圖識別人們的身份以進行秘密情報收集。在這方面,中國正在利用社交媒體平台——那些美國人用來保持聯絡或尋找工作的平台——來識別能夠接觸我國政府敏感信息的人,然後針對這些人試圖竊取這些信息。

Just to pick one example, a Chinese intelligence officer posing as a headhunter on a popular social media platform recently offered an American citizen a sizeable sum of money in exchange for so-called 「consulting」 services. That sounds benign enough until you realize those 「consulting」 services were related to sensitive information the American target had access to as a U.S. military intelligence specialist.

舉一個例子,一位中國情報人員最近在一個流行的社交媒體平台上冒充獵頭公司,向一位美國公民提供了一大筆錢,以換取所謂的「咨詢」服務。這聽起來很溫和,直到你意識到這些「咨詢」服務與這位作為美國軍事情報專家的藍金黃目標可以接觸到的敏感信息有關。

Now that particular tale has a happy ending: The American citizen did the right thing and reported the suspicious contact, and the FBI, working together with our armed forces, took it from there. I wish I could say that all such incidents ended that way.

現在,這個奇特的故事有了一個圓滿的結局:這位美國公民做了正確的事,舉報了可疑的接觸,聯邦調查局,連同我們的武裝部隊,繼而接手案件。我但願所有這類的事件都能有這樣的結局。

Threats to Academia

對學術界的威脅

It’s a troublingly similar story in academia.

這是學術界中令人不安的似曾相識的故事。

Through talent recruitment programs like the Thousand Talents Program I mentioned just a few moments ago, China pays scientists at American universities to secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China—including valuable, federally funded research. To put it bluntly, this means American taxpayers are effectively footing the bill for China’s own technological development. China then leverages its ill-gotten gains to undercut U.S. research institutions and companies, blunting our nation’s advancement and costing American jobs. And we are seeing more and more of these cases.

通過我剛才提到的「千人計劃」類似項目,中國收買美國科學家和大學,偷偷地將我們的知識和創新帶回中國——包括寶貴的、由聯邦政府資助的研究。說白了,這意味著美國納稅人正在為中國自身的技術發展買單。然後,中國利用其不義之財削弱美國研究機構和公司,阻礙我們國家的進步,並造成美國就業機會的減少。而我們看到越來越多的此類案例。

In May alone, we arrested both Qing Wang, a former researcher with the Cleveland Clinic who worked on molecular medicine and the genetics of cardiovascular disease, and Simon Saw-Teong Ang, a University of Arkansas scientist doing research for NASA. Both of these guys were allegedly committing fraud by concealing their participation in Chinese talent recruitment programs while accepting millions of dollars in American federal grant funding.

僅在5月份,我們就逮捕了在克利夫蘭診所從事分子醫學和心血管疾病遺傳學研究的前研究員王擎,和為美國宇航局(NASA)做研究的阿肯色大學科學家西蒙·洪。這兩人都涉嫌欺詐,他們隱瞞自己參與中國人才收買項目,同時接受數百萬美元的美國聯邦研究撥款。

That same month, former Emory University professor Xiao-Jiang Li pled guilty to filing a false tax return for failing to report the income he’d received through China’s Thousand Talents Program. Our investigation found that while Li was researching Huntington’s disease at Emory, he was also pocketing half a million unreported dollars from China.

同月,前埃默里大學教授李曉江因提交虛假納稅申報表,以瞞報通過中國「千人計劃」獲得的收入而認罪。我們的調查發現,在埃默里大學研究亨廷頓症的同時,還將來自中國未申報的50萬美元收入囊中。

In a similar vein, Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard’s Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, was indicted just last month for making false statements to federal authorities about his Thousand Talents participation. The United States has alleged that Lieber concealed from both Harvard and the NIH his position as a strategic scientist at a Chinese university—and the fact that the Chinese government was paying him, through the Wuhan Institute of Technology, a $50,000 monthly stipend, more than $150,000 in living expenses, and more than $1.5 million to establish a laboratory back in China.

同樣,哈佛大學化學與化學生物學系主席查爾斯·利伯(Charles Lieber)上月因向聯邦當局謊報他的「千人計劃」參而被起訴。美國指控利伯向哈佛大學和衛生研究院(NIH)隱瞞了他在中國一所大學的戰略科學家地位,以及中國政府通過武漢理工大學,向他支付每月5萬美元的津貼、超過15萬美元的生活費用和150多萬美元在中國建立實驗室的費用。

Malign Foreign Influence

惡意對外影響

There’s more. Another tool China and the Chinese Communist Party use to manipulate Americans is what we call malign foreign influence.

不止如此。中國操縱美國人的另一個工具,是惡意對外影響運動。

Now, traditional foreign influence is a normal, legal diplomatic activity typically conducted through diplomatic channels. But malign foreign influence efforts are subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive attempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our country’s public discourse, and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values.

如今,傳統的對外影響是一種正常的、合法的外交活動,一般通過外交渠道進行。但是,惡意的對外影響則是顛覆性的、未聲明的、犯罪的或脅迫性的企圖,目的是左右我國政府的政策,歪曲我國的公共輿論,破壞對我們民主進程和價值觀的信心。

China is engaged in a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign, and its methods include bribery, blackmail, and covert deals. Chinese diplomats also use both open, naked economic pressure and seemingly independent middlemen to push China’s preferences on American officials.

中國正在進行一場環環相扣的惡性對外影響運動,其手段包括賄賂、勒索和秘密交易。中國外交官還利用公開的、赤裸裸的經濟壓力,和利用貌似獨立實則受CCP控制的中間人,向美國官員推銷他們的觀點。

Just take one all-too-common illustration: Let’s say China gets wind that some American official is planning to travel to Taiwan—think a governor, a state senator, a member of Congress. China does not want that to happen, because that travel might appear to legitimize Taiwanese independence from China—and legitimizing Taiwan would, of course, be contrary to China’s 「One China」 policy.

就拿一個很常見的例子來說吧:比方說中國得到風聲說某位美國官員計劃前往台灣,比如一位州長、州參議員或國會議員。中國不希望這種情況發生,因為它擔心這種訪問會推動台灣獨立合法化,而使台灣合法化當然會違背中國的所謂「一中」政策。

So what does China do? Well, China has leverage over the American official’s constituents—American companies, academics, and members of the media all have legitimate and understandable reasons to want access to Chinese partners and markets. And because of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party, China has immense power over those same partners and markets. So, China will sometimes start by trying to influence the American official overtly and directly. China might openly warn that if the American official goes ahead and takes that trip to Taiwan, China will take it out on a company from that official’s home state by withholding the company’s license to manufacture in China. That could be economically ruinous for the company, would directly pressure the American official to alter his travel plans, and the official would know that China was trying to influence him.

那麼,中國會怎麼做呢?好吧,中國對美國官員的選民們有影響力,因為美國公司、學者和媒體成員都有合法和可以理解的理由希望獲得中國的合作夥伴和市場。由於中國共產黨的專制本質,中國對這些合作夥伴和市場擁有巨大的控制力。因此,中國有時會試圖從公開和直接地影響美國官員下手。中國可能會公開警告,如果這位美國官員繼續前往台灣,中國將對該官員所在州的一家公司發洩,扣押該公司在中國的生產許可證。這可能會給公司帶來經濟上毀滅性的損失,直接迫使該美國官員改變其旅行計劃,而這位官員也會知道中國正試圖影響他。

That would be bad enough. But the Chinese Communist Party often doesn’t stop there; it can’t stop there if it wants to stay in power—so it uses its leverage even more perniciously. If China’s more direct, overt influence campaign doesn’t do the trick, they sometimes turn to indirect, covert, deceptive influence efforts.

那原已經夠糟了。但中共往往不止於此;如果它想繼續掌權,就不能止步於此,所以它甚至會採取更加歹毒的手段。如果中國採取更直接、公開的干預行動無法奏效,他們有時會轉而採取間接、隱蔽以及欺騙性的方式。

To continue with the illustration of the American official with travel plans that the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t like, China will work relentlessly to identify the people closest to that official—the people that official trusts most. China will then work to influence those people to act on China’s behalf as middlemen to influence the official. The co-opted middlemen may then whisper in the official’s ear and try to sway the official’s travel plans or public positions on Chinese policy. These intermediaries, of course, aren’t telling the American official that they’re Chinese Communist Party pawns—and worse still, some of these intermediaries may not even realize they’re being used as pawns, because they, too, have been deceived.

繼續舉例:當美國官員的行動計劃是中共不喜歡時,中國將不遺餘力地找出與該官員(官方最信任的人)最親近的人。然後,中國將努力讓這些人以中間人的名義,實為維護中國的利益來影響這位官員。然後,被拉攏的中間人可能會在該官員耳邊竊竊私語並試圖左右官員的出行計劃或對華政策的公開立場。當然,這些中間人並沒有告訴美國官員他們是中共的棋子——更糟糕的是,這些中間人甚至並未意識到他們正被當成棋子,因為他們被蒙騙了。

Ultimately, China doesn’t hesitate to use smoke, mirrors, and misdirection to influence Americans.

歸根結底,中國毫不猶豫地使用欺騙信息和誤導信息來影響美國人。

Similarly, China often pushes academics and journalists to self-censor if they want to travel into China. And we’ve seen the Chinese Communist Party pressure American media and sporting giants to ignore or suppress criticism of China’s ambitions regarding Hong Kong or Taiwan. This kind of thing is happening over and over, across the United States.

同樣,如果學者和記者想進入中國,中國經常會強迫他們進行自我審查。我們看到中共向美國媒體和體育巨頭施壓,要求他們無視或壓制對中國涉足香港或台灣問題的批評言論。這種事在美國各地一而再再而三地發生。

And I will note that the pandemic has unfortunately not stopped any of this—in fact, we have heard from federal, state, and even local officials that Chinese diplomats are aggressively urging support for China’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis. Yes, this is happening at both the federal and state levels. Not that long ago, we had a state senator who was recently even asked to introduce a resolution supporting China’s response to the pandemic.

我要指出很不幸的是這種情況在疫情大流行期間也絲毫沒有改變——事實上,我們從聯邦、州甚至地方官員那裡聽說:中國外交官正極具攻擊性地敦促各方支持中國處理新冠肺炎危機。是的,該情況正在聯邦和州兩級中發生。不久前,我們有一位州參議員,他甚至被要求提出一項支持中國應對流行病的決議。

The punchline is this: All of these seemingly inconsequential pressures add up to a policymaking environment in which Americans find themselves held over a barrel by the Chinese Communist Party.

關鍵點在於:所有這些看似無關緊要的壓力相結合就促成了一種政策制定環境,即美國人發現他們自己已任中共擺布了。

Threats to the Rule of Law

對法治的威脅

All the while, China’s government and Communist Party have brazenly violated well-settled norms and the rule of law.

中國政府和共產黨始終在厚顏無恥地公然違反制定好的准則和法律法規。

Since 2014, Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has spearheaded a program known as 「Fox Hunt.」 Now, China describes Fox Hunt as some kind of international anti-corruption campaign—it is not. Instead, Fox Hunt is a sweeping bid by General Secretary Xi to target Chinese nationals whom he sees as threats and who live outside China, across the world. We’re talking about political rivals, dissidents, and critics seeking to expose China’s extensive human rights violations.

自2014年以來,中國總書記習近平帶頭啓動了一項”獵狐”的計劃。如今,中國將獵狐行動描述為某種國際反腐敗運動——事實並非如此。相反,獵狐行動是由習總書記開展的意在針對具有威脅並聚居海外的中國公民的清剿行動。這些被其視為有威脅人的包括:政治對手、異議分子以及試圖揭露中國大量侵犯人權行為的批評者。

Hundreds of the Fox Hunt victims that they target live right here in the United States, and many are American citizens or green card holders. The Chinese government wants to force them to return to China, and China’s tactics to accomplish that are shocking. For example, when it couldn’t locate one Fox Hunt target, the Chinese government sent an emissary to visit the target’s family here in the United States. The message they said to pass on? The target had two options: return to China promptly, or commit suicide. And what happens when Fox Hunt targets refuse to return to China? In the past, their family members both here in the United States and in China have been threatened and coerced, and those back in China have even been arrested for leverage.

其中數百名獵狐行動的受害者就生活在美國,他們中有許多已成為美國公民或持有美國綠卡。中國政府想將他們強制遣送回國,同時他們為達目的所採取的策略令人發指。比如說,當它(中共)無法定位獵狐名單人員時,中國政府就會派遣間諜來美國拜訪他的家人。他們(間諜)要傳遞的信息是什麼呢?名單中的人只有兩個選擇:立即回中國或者自殺。如果獵狐行動目標人員拒絕回國將會發生何事?從過往來看,他們在美國和中國的家人都要受到威脅和脅迫,在中國的家人甚至會遭到逮捕而成為威脅的籌碼。

I’ll take this opportunity to note that if you believe the Chinese government is targeting you—that you’re a potential Fox Hunt victim—please reach out to your local FBI field office.

我要借此機會提醒:如果你認為中國政府正盯上你——你可能成為獵狐行動受害者——請與當地FBI聯繫。

Exploiting Our Openness

利用我們的開放

Understanding how a nation could engage in these tactics brings me to the third thing the American people need to remember: that China has a fundamentally different system than ours—and it’s doing all it can to exploit the openness of ours while taking advantage of its own closed system.

瞭解一個國家如何使用這些策略,讓我想到美國人民需要記住的第三件事:中國有一個與我們的完全不同的體系,它正傾其所有地利用我們的開放性,同時也在利用他們的封閉體制。

Many of the distinctions that mean a lot here in the United States are blurry or almost nonexistent in China—I’m talking about distinctions between the government and the Chinese Communist Party, between the civilian and military sectors, and between the state and the 「private」 sector.

在美國,有許多意義重大差別在中國卻是模糊不清或幾乎相同的——我指的是政府與中國共產黨之間、民事和軍事部門之間、公有與「私營」之間的區別。

For one thing, an awful lot of large Chinese businesses are state-owned enterprises—literally owned by the government, and thus the Party. And even if they aren’t, China’s laws allow its government to compel any Chinese company to provide any information it requests—including American citizens’ data.

首先,很多大型中國企業都是國有企業—實為政府所有,因此也屬於黨。即使並非如此,中國的法律賦予中國政府權力能強迫任何中國公司提供他們所需要的任何信息,包括美國公民的數據。

On top of that, Chinese companies of any real size are legally required to have Communist Party 「cells」 inside them to keep them in line. Even more alarmingly, Communist Party cells have reportedly been established in some American companies operating in China as a cost of doing business there.

除此之外,任何實具規模的中國公司都被合法地要求設立黨支部以讓他們循規蹈矩。更令人震驚的是,傳聞某些美國公司以成立黨支部為代價在中國從事經營活動。

These kinds of features should give U.S. companies pause when they consider working with Chinese corporations like Huawei—and should give all Americans pause, too, when relying on such a company’s devices and networks. As the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Huawei has broad access to much that American companies do in China. It’s also been charged in the United States with racketeering conspiracy and has, as alleged in the indictment, repeatedly stolen intellectual property from U.S. companies, obstructed justice, and lied to the U.S. government and its commercial partners, including banks.

當美國公司考慮與華為這樣的中國公司合作時,這些特徵應該讓美國公司三思,在使用中國公司的設備和網絡時,所有美國人也應該三思而後行。作為全球最大的電信設備製造商,華為與美國公司在中國擁有廣泛的業務往來。該公司還在美國被控參與敲詐勒索,如起訴書所述,它多次竊取美國公司的知識產權,妨礙司法公正,並對美國政府及其包括銀行在內的商業夥伴撒謊。

The allegations are clear: Huawei is a serial intellectual property thief, with a pattern and practice of disregarding both the rule of law and the rights of its victims. I have to tell you, it certainly caught my attention to read a recent article describing the words of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, about the company’s mindset. At a Huawei research and development center, he reportedly told employees that to ensure the company’s survival, they need to—and I quote—「surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.」 He’s also reportedly told employees that Huawei has entered, to quote, 「a state of war.」 I certainly hope he couldn’t have meant that literally, but it’s hardly an encouraging tone, given the company’s repeated criminal behavior.

這些指控非常明確:華為是一個多次參與知識產權盜竊的竊賊,其行為模式不僅無視法治也不尊重受害者的權利。我不得不告訴你們,最近有一篇文章引起了我的關注,該文章描述了華為創始人任正非關於公司思維模式的言論。據報道,他在華為的一個研發中心告訴員工:為了確保公司生存,他們需要(我引用他的話)「激流勇進,擋我則死,殺出一條血路」。據說他還告訴員工說華為已經進入「戰爭狀態」。我當然希望他的真意並非如此, 但考慮到公司一再的犯罪行為, 這可不是什麼鼓舞人心的語氣。

In our modern world, there is perhaps no more ominous prospect than a hostile foreign government’s ability to compromise our country’s infrastructure and devices. If Chinese companies like Huawei are given unfettered access to our telecommunications infrastructure, they could collect any of your information that traverses their devices or networks. Worse still: They’d have no choice but to hand it over to the Chinese government if asked—the privacy and due process protections that are sacrosanct in the United States are simply non-existent in China.

在我們的現代世界,與敵對的外國政府破壞我國基礎設施和設備的能力相比,沒有什麼比這更可怕了。如果像華為這樣的中國公司能夠不受限制地參與我們的電信基礎設施建設,他們就可以通過他們的設備和網絡收集你們的所有信息。更糟的是:如果中國政府需要,他們別無選擇,只能將其上交——在美國神聖不可侵犯的隱私和正當程序保護在中國根本不存在。

Responding Effectively to the Threat

有效應對威脅

The Chinese government is engaged in a broad, diverse campaign of theft and malign influence, and it can execute that campaign with authoritarian efficiency. They’re calculating. They’re persistent. They’re patient. And they’re not subject to the righteous constraints of an open, democratic society or the rule of law.

中國政府正在從事一場廣泛而多樣化的盜竊和具有惡意影響的運動,它能以獨裁的效率執行這場運動。他們深謀遠慮、堅持不懈、富有耐心。他們完全不受開放民主社會或法治的正義約束。

China, as led by the Chinese Communist Party, is going to continue to try to misappropriate our ideas, influence our policymakers, manipulate our public opinion, and steal our data. They will use an all-tools and all-sectors approach—and that demands our own all-tools and all-sectors approach in response.

由中共領導的中國一直在試圖侵佔我們的想法,影響我們的決策者,操縱我們的公眾輿論以及竊取我們的數據。他們使用一切工具,發動所有部門來達到目的,這就要求我們要做出全面回應。

Our folks at the FBI are working their tails off every day to protect our nation’s companies, our universities, our computer networks, and our ideas and innovation. To do that, we’re using a broad set of techniques—from our traditional law enforcement authorities to our intelligence capabilities.

我們FBI的同事們每天都在竭盡全力地保護我們國家的公司、高校、計算機網絡以及我們的想法和創新。從傳統的執法部門到我們的情報部門都在使用一系列廣泛的技術來達到此保護目的。

And I will briefly note that we’re having real success. With the help of our many foreign partners, we’ve arrested targets all over the globe. Our investigations and the resulting prosecutions have exposed the tradecraft and techniques the Chinese use, raising awareness of the threat and our industries’ defenses. They also show our resolve and our ability to attribute these crimes to those responsible. It’s one thing to make assertions—but in our justice system, when a person, or a corporation, is investigated and then charged with a crime, we have to prove the truth of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. The truth matters—and so, these criminal indictments matter. And we’ve seen how our criminal indictments have rallied other nations to our cause—which is crucial to persuading the Chinese government to change its behavior.

我將扼要地指出我們取得了實質性的成功。在許多外國合作夥伴的幫助下,我們在全球範圍逮捕目標人物。我們的調查和由此產生的檢舉揭發暴露了中國使用的間諜情報技術和手段,同時也提高了人們對威脅和行業防禦意識。它們也顯示出我們要將罪犯繩之以法的決心和能力。指控是一回事,但在我們的司法體系里,當一個人或一家公司被調查而後被指控犯罪時,我們必須毫無疑問地證明指控的真實性。所以,這些刑事起訴很重要。同時,我們看到這些刑事起訴是如何將其他國家聯合起來支持我們的——這對於說服中國政府改變其行為至關重要。

We’re also working more closely than ever with partner agencies here in the U.S. and our partners abroad. We can’t do it on our own; we need a whole-of-society response. That’s why we in the intelligence and law enforcement communities are working harder than ever to give companies, universities, and the American people themselves the information they need to make their own informed decisions and protect their most valuable assets.

我們現在比以往任何時候都更緊密地與美國國內、國外的夥伴合作。靠著我們自己無法做到,我們需要全社會的響應。這就是為何我們的情報界和執法界要比以往任何時候都更加努力地工作,來為公司、大學和美國人民提供他們需要的信息,以便他們能做出明智決定和保護他們最寶貴的資產。

Confronting this threat effectively does not mean we shouldn’t do business with the Chinese. It does not mean we shouldn’t host Chinese visitors. It does not mean we shouldn’t welcome Chinese students or coexist with China on the world stage. But it does mean that when China violates our criminal laws and international norms, we are not going to tolerate it, much less enable it. The FBI and our partners throughout the U.S. government will hold China accountable and protect our nation’s innovation, ideas, and way of life—with the help and vigilance of the American people.

有效地應對威脅並不意味著我們不應與中國人做生意,不意味著我們不應接待中國遊客、不意味著我們不應歡迎中國學生或在世界舞台上與中國共存。但它確實意味著當中國違反我們的刑法和國際准則時,我們將不會容忍它,更不會允許它。美國聯邦調查局和我們在政府中的合作夥伴將追究中國的責任,並在美國人民的幫助和警惕下保護我們國家的創新、理念以及生活方式。

Thank you for having me here today.

謝謝你們今天邀請我到這裡。

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翻譯:【Dlrow】【重生者】校對:【EricLiu】字幕:【Naomi (文花開)】【相機過熱啊】

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FBI局長哈德遜演講: CCP對美國經濟和國家安全的威脅

FBI指控中共搞亂美國政府和私營企業

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FBI大量抓獲中共間諜,北京強迫異議人士回國

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“but those who hope in the Lord will renew their strength. They will soar on wings like eagles; they will run and not grow weary, they will walk and not be faint” 【Isaiah 40:31】 7月 29日